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Introduction 
Europe has not let Poland and the Poles down. It is now up to us to 
shoulder the responsibility for a proper use of the sizable financial 
assistance from the EU. Let us implement the vision of a strong Poland 
in a strong and solidarity-bound Europe (Kwaśniewski 2005). 
1.1 Main objective of the thesis 
On 31 August 2005, political leaders from all over Europe gathered in Gdańsk, 
Poland, to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the strikes and demonstrations 
that won Poles the right to form independent trade unions that led to the Solidarity 
movement, so important for mobilising the Polish populace in order to end 
communism. Lech Wałęsa fiery and engaging speeches from on top of the main gate 
of the Lenin Shipyard in Poland’s Hanseatic port town of Gdańsk captivated a large 
part of the Polish population, from professors and priests to proletarians and punks. 
10 million Poles were members of Solidarity until it was forbidden in December 
1981. The political leaders present in Poland for the anniversary were not only 
remembering a proud moment of Polish history. The presences of Viktor Yushchenko 
and Mikheil Saakashvili from the Ukraine and Georgia reminded us that much work 
is left regarding the democratisation of our continent (The Guardian 2005).  
Similar scenes as those from the joyful anniversary of Solidarity in August 2005 took 
place a year earlier, on 1 May 2004. On this day Poland formally entered the 
European Union (EU) together with 7 other post-communist countries,1 Malta and 
Cyprus, having in many ways completed the democratic transition by meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria after over a decade of restructuring and economic, political, and 
social reforms. These criteria, that accession countries have to implement in order to 
qualify for EU membership, were laid down at the Council of the EU in Copenhagen 
 
1 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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in 1993, and involve political and economic and legislative alignment with the Acquis 
Communautaire the total body of EU law.2 Apart from within some policy areas 
where an intermediary phase is still in force,3 the new EU members from Central 
Europe and the Baltic states, known as the EU-8, are now legally integrated EU 
citizens with votes in the European Parliament, politicians and bureaucrats in 
Brussels, large numbers of EU directives to implement and great sums of EU funding 
flooding into the national budgets through Cohesion and Structural Funds. The EU 
enlargement in May 2004 celebrated an important milestone for the transformation of 
the EU-8 into liberal democracies, and served as a reminder of how the promise of an 
EU membership can have a strong democratising effect, relevant for discussions on 
future enlargement in the Balkans and Turkey, after Romania and Bulgaria join the 
EU in 2007 or 2008.            
1.1.1 Democratic Consolidation 
Rome wasn’t built in a day — neither the city nor the treaty — and the same goes for 
the democratisation processes in the post-communist EU states.4 After the wall is torn 
down, the parliament stormed and the new constitution signed, the substantive, “fine-
tuning” of democratic consolidation commences so that: “democracy becomes 
routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, 
as well as in political calculations for achieving success” (Kaldor & Vejvoda 
1999:3). Like the passionate mechanic who spends countless hours under the bonnet 
of his vintage sports car adjusting the engine to get the best possible performance, 
democratic tuning is a long process that is expected to take more than the 15 or so 
years from the end of communism to the EU integration on 1 May 2004.  
 
2 The Council of the EU is referred to as the Council in the text below, while the Acquis Communautaire is solely the 
Acquis.   
3 The post-communist EU members have still not signed the Schengen Agreement, and for the moment they neither have 
the single currency nor the same rights as older members for working abroad in most other EU countries.   
4 The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, and was signed on 25 March 1957 by the same 6 
Western European States that started the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. 
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In this respect it is important to make the distinction between democratic transition 
and consolidation. A standard perception is that democratic transition is completed 
when:  
Sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government, when a government comes to power 
that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government 
de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new 
democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure (Linz 
& Stepan 1996:3). 
The fine-tuning that remains, the democratic consolidation, is a longer process 
incorporating the many extra tasks that need to be accomplished, habits and 
conditions that must be firmly established before democracy truly can be perceived 
as, in Linz and Stepan’s words: “the only game in town.” They have offered a 
conceptual framework for studying democratic consolidation that has become widely 
influential. Linz and Stepan suggest that consolidation combines behavioural, 
attitudinal and constitutional dimensions, and that conditions must exist for the 
sustainability of five interacting arenas, that reinforce each other in order to 
consolidate the democracy. These arenas are: a free and lively civil society, an 
autonomous political society, rule of law, a state apparatus and an economic society 
(Linz & Stepan 1996).  
In this thesis I study such consolidation and inter-arena interaction in an EU Member 
State with an authoritarian legacy, in order to conclude that work must still be done to 
improve the cooperation and dialogue between the different democratic arenas 
regarding the implementation of EU Funds. Ever since the end of communism in 
1989 joining the EU has been a fundamental motivation for this consolidation as 
Poland and the other EU-8 countries have been working hard at implementing EU 
policy in order to fulfil the membership criteria and modernise their communities, 
often physically and mentally run down after 44 years of communism. The pre- and 
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post-accession financial aid5 is such policy, where national and regional government 
is asked to establish and administer EU projects in an efficient, transparent and 
consolidated fashion, through constructive cooperation and dialogue with the whole 
of society. The EU Funds are extremely important for the EU-8. Set up for the period 
after accession in 2004 until the new EU budget commences in 2007, these funds are 
to implement over € 12.8 billion from the EU budget in Poland alone, through mainly 
Cohesion and Structural Funds (NSRF 2005).  
1.2 Partnership —  the dependent variable 
The dialogue that is expected with society is exemplified by the partnership 
principle. Stated in Article 8. of Council regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 setting up the 
Structural Funds, this principle invites social and economic partners from a broad 
range of stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, 
local authorities and business interest groups, to help plan, implement and monitor 
the funding schemes, and in that way create:  
A wide and effective association of all the relevant bodies, according to 
national rules and practice, taking account of the need to promote 
equality between men and women and sustainable development through 
the integration of environmental protection and improvement 
requirements (Council of the EU 1999). 
Sticking to this partnership principle is by no means always easy. It craves patience, 
good behaviour and a will to compromise of all those taking part, if a community is 
going to decide on unpopular but necessary projects. On the other hand, a broad 
partnership with the whole of society increases the legitimacy of the decisions finally 
made, improves transparency and helps democratic consolidation by strengthening 
the interaction between different arenas of society.  
 
5 ISPA, SAPPARD and PHARE are examples of pre-accession funds while Cohesion and Structural Funds are main 
sources of funding after accession in 2004 
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This interaction is especially interesting to study in post-communist states, as 
partnership and pluralism are often understood as democratic values, not easily 
installed in a new regime over night, and even confused by similar values and 
partnerships that existed within and between the various arenas during communism. 
Civil society is an interesting focal point in this sense since its independence was 
mostly disallowed during communism and thereby not seen as a partaking arena in a 
liberal democratic sense. On the other hand civil society was strong and lively in its 
own antiauthoritarian way, and helped bring democracy to communist Europe at the 
end of the 20th century. After democratic transition and EU membership we can 
therefore expect partnership and civil society itself to be both better and worse off in 
Poland and the EU-8 than in other Member States, where the citizens have not 
recently had to struggle for democracy. This brings me to the description of my 
research question.  
1.3 My research question 
The exact question I am posing is how democratic consolidation, or the lack of such 
consolidation effects the participation of environmental non-governmental 
organisations (ENGOs) in the programming of EU Funds in Poland.  
By programming I mean the planning phase of EU Funds, including the selection 
process for choosing funding beneficiaries. This selection process is often referred to 
as “implementation”, but in this thesis it is studied as part of the programming phase. 
Generally speaking then, I am studying how the ENGO sector is consulted regarding 
the planning of EU Fund spending.  
Participation is in this sense a broad description that includes consultation on both 
individual projects and the setting up of the funding schemes as described in the 
programming documents for the EU Funds, e.g. the Polish National Development 
Plan (NDP) and its legal act from 20 April 2004. As a special case I will also study 
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the participation of ENGOs in steering committees set up for project selection for the 
Cohesion Fund (CF).  
Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) are central and well 
organised representatives of civil society, actively taking part in the programming of 
EU funds at both a regional, national and international level.  
EU Funds is a term I use for Cohesion and Structural Funds. As I am focusing on the 
environmental, public advocacy groups in civil society it is interesting to study 
funding that either negatively affects the environment in some way or deals with 
environmental issues directly. The Cohesion and Structural Funds are such financial 
mechanisms, directly supporting the construction and modernisation of roads, 
railways, dams and other big infrastructural developments. In wider terms these funds 
are supporting economic growth and increasing the standard of living, issues that also 
relate to environmentalism. These funds are also by far the largest EU Funds, 
redistributing a third of the EU budget.  
Democratic consolidation is the interaction between the ENGOs in civil society, and 
the political society, rule of law, state apparatus and economic society. I have 
restricted myself to studying how the variables given to me by Linz and Stepan’s 
democratic consolidation framework affects ENGO partnership in EU Funds in order 
to keep to what is at least the outline of a path through a potential minefield, and to 
what can be a constructive way of understanding a complex issue such as democracy.  
1.4 Contextualising my study 
Studying the “indirect” effects of EU policy on civil society as caused by the 
partnership in programming EU funds is interesting since it helps describe the 
relationship between economic growth and societal development on the one hand, 
and the development of political democracy on the other. A rush has taken place in 
the EU-8 countries to catch up economically and socially with the EU-15 that might 
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involve cutting some corners on time consuming, but important democratic processes 
like the partnership principle.  
The post-communist role of the traditionally strong elements of civil society in the 
EU-8, like the Catholic Church and Solidarity movement in Poland, is also less clear 
and even perceived as weakened after the fall of communism in Europe. This can 
partly be explained by the fact that civil society during communism was often of an 
antiestablishment character, creating an “us” vs. “them” barrier between civil society 
and the authoritarian regime. With the introduction of democracy, one could no 
longer place all the blame on “them”, and the internal conflicts within civil society 
began to materialise (Ost 2005). 
In a western liberal democratic tradition on the other hand, civil society has a long 
tradition of being in a triangular relationship with state and market. In this perspective 
all three sectors are autonomously cooperating and checking each other, creating an 
efficient society and limiting government power.  This can be perceived as having 
created a power structure that is more horizontal and decentralised than in 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Although, such a western system can be said to 
especially favour the market more than civil society, such a notion of de-emphasizing 
government and letting the market take charge of certain policy areas, can also be 
seen as favourable to the social sector. In such a liberal political sense civil society is 
believed to promote transparency and efficiency regarding the implementation of 
local, national or international policy, in the same way as for example including the 
private sector in the running of domestic public services is seen as promoting these 
values. The epitome of this argument can be made for implementation of 
humanitarian aid in third world countries, where financing civil society in the form of 
aid agencies is sometimes regarded as the only way to ensure that people receive help 
in the face of a corrupt, undemocratic regime. 
The European Commission has seen the need to cooperate more with civil society as 
well as with local and regional government as part of strengthening EU democracy, 
and released its white paper on governance in 2001, in order to spark the debate. 
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There seems to be an array of persistent problems concerning the fundamentals of EU 
governance such as the community method, the institutional modus operandi 
operating for most EU policy, also European integration. In this sphere the European 
Commission acts as an executive with right of initiative, while the European 
Parliament and the Council have joint co-legislative roles. This is supposed to be 
effective and fair for all parts involved, but with almost 460 million EU citizens in 25 
Member States of different shapes and sizes, there’s bound to be trouble. Europeans 
will easily feel alienated from politics in Brussels, resulting in them not taking a great 
deal of interest in European policymaking. The exception to this trend was the 
referendums on the European Constitution in 2005, where a majority of voters in 
France and the Netherlands had opinions about the future of the Union, and 
consequently rejected the constitution. The irony being that this constitution was 
created as the single most important way of improving the EU’s governance 
problems (European Commission 2001). 
The white paper from 2001 does not propose the dramatic strengthening of the role of 
civil society in EU processes, as it is perceived to be the individual Member State’s 
responsibility to include this sector in policy making. Still, the paper suggests more 
partnership arrangements for consultation with local partners and more flexibility for 
how EU legislation can be implemented in a way that takes account of local 
conditions and civil society (European Commission 2001).  
1.5 The subject of analysis — ENGOs as social partners  
My dependent variable “partnership” will be approached through a case study of how 
Polish ENGOs are adapting to life in the EU, more specifically how they experience 
such capacity building and partnerships with government, the business sector or 
other NGOs, through the programming of EU funds relevant for the environmental 
sector. 
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The term “NGO”, which is often liberally granted to all sorts of organisations that are 
not governmental, is understood here as the public interest advocacy dimension of 
civil society rather than a regular membership organisation. An ENGO in this respect 
is an organisation (or a federation of organisations) that spends its time lobbying in 
the political sphere, being a watchdog of government policy, taking part in the public 
debate and educating citizens on topics it finds important and relating to the cause of 
environmentalism and sustainable development. Although the NGO sector is often 
portrayed as a central part of civil society, it is important to stress that NGOs neither 
share the broad cooperative ethos of collectivism among themselves, nor have the 
wide enough community support to be regarded as the direct incarnation of civil 
society. On the other hand these interest advocacy organisations show us the potential 
of civil society and are crucial to democracy because they seek to influence 
governmental policy on specific issues (Mendelson & Glenn 2002; Whitehead 
2002:68). 
A reason for focusing on organisations that seek to influence at a governmental level 
is that a serious lack of political trust is expected in young and not fully-consolidated 
democracies. NGOs in post-communist Europe are expected to be very sceptical of 
the political society and state apparatus, while politicians and bureaucrats are thought 
to have more problems accepting nosy and critical NGOs than apolitical and harmless 
civil society organisations (CSOs) like youth clubs, or neighbourhood and 
recreational organisations. Although not directly applicable to Poland, a bill passed in 
the Russian Parliament (Duma) on 23 November 2005 restricting foreign NGOs in 
Russia on the ground that these were infiltrating Russian politics, exemplifies my 
idea that young post-communist “democracies” can have a tendency to approach 
power and governance in a vertical way, seeing NGOs and civil society as foes or 
competitors, rather than friendly team players (Associated Press 2005).6 The role of 
Solidarity and the Catholic Church in bringing down communism in Poland as 
 
6 Linz and Stepan’s Democratic Threshold Rating aggregates civil liberties and political rights in different post-communist 
countries. Russia is ranked as a borderline case while Poland is above the democratic threshold (1996:447).  
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described in chapter 3 is a good example of the threat that a strong civil society can 
pose to an authoritarian regime.   
Including ENGOs in the important decisions that have to be made regarding 
Cohesion and Structural funds is important since they will be able to contribute 
technical or environmental competence, or local knowledge, that can be extremely 
important for the success of a proposed project, and even for the wellbeing of the 
whole region involved7. The environmental partners are not only verifying that the 
funding is implemented in accordance with both Polish and EU environmental policy, 
but partnership in itself entails a flow of information that creates transparency 
regarding who is taking which decisions and what money is being spent where. At 
the end of the day this openness is paramount for hindering corruption and 
mismanagement.  
On the other hand ENGOs are potential troublemakers that can slow down or 
sabotage an important project with their lack of will to compromise, naive bickering 
or concrete idealism. The liberal democratic triangular cooperation between state, 
market and civil society is expected to be especially difficult in EU-8, since ambitious 
goals of economic growth for combating unemployment and speeding up 
modernisation will often clash with interests promoting environmental sustainability, 
in a region of Europe that already has a legacy of environmental issues and potholed 
roads to deal with after over 44 years of communism.8  
The important values of environmentalism and sustainable development, advocated 
by ENGOs and other CSOs within this field are reasons in themselves for focusing on 
the interaction of these organisations with EU funding. Consumption is dramatically 
on the rise in the EU-8, matching the sharply increasing GDP pr capita in purchasing 
power standards (PPS). Polish purchasing power is now at approximately half the 
 
7 “Fallout” in the environmental policy area is never entirely local. The Byelorussians certainly realised this after the 
accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant across the border in the Ukraine in 1986. 
8 Poland has the highest unemployment in the EU, with over 17.4 % unemployed in November 2005. For young adults 
under 25, the figure is 37 % (Eurostat 2006)! 
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EU-25 average, currently held by Spain and Italy (Eurostat 2005).9 In these budding 
consumption societies, new issues of traffic congestion and waste management are 
already surfacing. It is a pity if this part of Europe has to make the same mistakes as 
Western Europe has made before the importance of sustainable development and 
environmental protection is acknowledged. As of today Poland has modified smaller 
part of its natural environment than most other EU Member States, and Poles produce 
only half the amount of waste as Western Europeans. Environmentalists see this 
historical underdevelopment as a unique feature that can give growth to new sectors 
such as eco-tourism and organic farming (NSRF 2005).   
For the EU as a whole environmentalism and sustainable development took an 
important turn with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) at 
the Council summit in Gothenburg in 2001. Since then it has been a proclaimed goal 
to make sure that the three pillars of economic, social and environmental 
sustainability go hand-in-hand and mutually reinforce each other in all EU policy 
(European Commission 2001). This goal has also made its mark on the Cohesion and 
Structural Funds, and the partnership principle of including economic and social 
partners is part of this argument regarding sustainability.  
1.6 Relevant background information on Poland 
1.6.1 Poland and the EU Funds 
Over 38 million people live in Poland, approximately half of all the new EU citizens 
from the enlargement in 2004. Geographically Poland is the sixth largest country in 
the EU-25, and the second poorest after Latvia concerning GDP pr. capita. Poland is 
therefore naturally enough the largest recipient of EU funding. From accession in 
 
9 The figures for 2003 and 2004, show an increase in GDP-PPS in all new EU Member States except Hungary and Slovakia 
that remained stable at 60 and 52 % of EU-25 average purchasing power. Poland’s purchasing power had increased from 47 
to 49 % of EU-25 average (Eurostat 2005).  
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2004 until the end of this budget period in 2006, over € 12.8 billion from the EU 
budget will be spent together with Polish funding on implementing the NDP valued 
at € 17.6 billion. € 8.3 billion of the EU financing is tied to the Structural Funds (SFs) 
and implemented through a Community Support Framework (CSF) which is attached 
to seven distinct Sectoral Operational Programmes (SOPs). The focus of the SOPs 
range from developing fisheries, agricultural regions and the public transport system, 
to generally increasing the competitiveness of Polish economy and expanding human 
resources in the direction set out by the Council in the Lisbon Strategy from 2000 
(NSRF 2005:33).  
Another € 4.2 billion from the EU budget is to be spent in Poland through the 
Cohesion Fund (CF), a funding scheme exclusively for the poorest EU Member 
States, meant to strengthen transport and environmental infrastructure. 
The rest of the € 0.3 billion in NDP funding from Brussels, is put aside for 
interregional projects across national borders (Interreg) and a pan-European 
employment project (Equal). 
The non EU-members of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway, Iceland and 
Lichtenstein have also set up financial mechanisms for the new Member States, and 
plan to spend approximately € 0.5 billion in Poland from 2004 until to 2009. The 
main aim of all this financial aid is to speed up Polish convergence with the socio-
economic development of the EU (European Commission 2004a; NSRF 2005)  
In general, financial assistance from the EU and EEA is extremely important for 
Poland at the moment, since the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007/2008 is 
expected to shift Brussels’ financing focus eastwards. This has already happened with 
many foreign financiers, from George Soros and Ford Foundation to the World Bank 
and USAID, having reduced their activity in the EU-8 and instead chasing new, 
needy markets further east, in places like Georgia and the Ukraine. Funding in the 
new Member States was also a big issue at the EU Council in December 2005 
deciding on the long term budget for 2007–2013. The EU-8 were initially very 
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disappointed with the small budget proposed by Britain, but happy at the end of the 
day when a more generous budget was ratified after the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel had shifted her weight around (The Economist 2005)   
1.6.2 Civil Society 
Apart from being the largest recipient of EU Funds, Poland is also a country 
renowned for its strong tradition of civil society. This tradition dates back several 
centuries and has helped keep a Polish spirit and national identity alive during the 
hardship of partitions, war and communism. The Solidarity movement that started in 
Gdańsk at the beginning of the 1980s gained support all over the world and is 
credited an important role in bringing an end to communism in Europe. Religion has 
also played a very important role in Poland, as exemplified by Ronald Inglehart’s 
term “hyper-Catholicism”, arguing that here as in Ireland, religion and politics are 
strongly entwined (1997:99).  
The Catholic Church and Solidarity have been able to grow so strong for partly the 
same reason, that these institutions have become focal points for independent, Polish 
civic activity and thus creating a detached, uniquely Polish, civil society in times 
when an autonomous Polish state did not exist. It is interesting to relate this 
perception of civil society having arrived first, helping to build formal democracy in 
Poland, to the notion of civil society being part of the final consolidation phase of 
democratisation theory. With this historical legacy one would on the one hand expect 
Poland to have the best chances of consolidating its democracy and of interacting 
civil society with the state and political arenas. On the other hand the base of the 
traditional civic activity has been anti-political as civil society in Poland has grown so 
strong during partitions, Nazi-occupation and communism by despising “them”, the 
foreign, atheist oppressors in the state apparatus and political society. The roundtable 
negotiations at the end of communism showed that the political and civil society 
could communicate if necessary, even if the political problems that later occurred and 
which helped maintain a stable distrust of Polish politics in the 1990s were blamed on 
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the same roundtable not resulting in a clear break with communism (Linz & Stepan 
1996).   
1.7 Posing my hypotheses 
Right from the first moment I began taking an interest in European funds, at a 
seminar in Warsaw in 2005 on NGO participation in EEA financing, I was made 
aware that there were some “issues” related to the smooth workings of these funds. 
From a financing perspective it is easy to think that one is being extremely generous 
and that the beneficiaries will be pleased irrespective. At the receiving end there are 
often high expectations leading to frustration when things do not work out as planned 
or promised. Three interconnected problems are identified by the ENGO milieu 
concerning the inclusion of civil society in EU and EEA funds in Poland: A weak 
civil society, a post-communist State apparatus and impracticable and bureaucratic 
EU and EEA policy. 
In this thesis I focus on these issues in the context of democratic consolidation theory, 
which means I will primarily be discussing the two first problems from an internal 
Polish perspective rather than the more institutional relationship between Brussels 
and Poland as a Member State. Concretely, the theoretical expectations can be posed 
as the following hypotheses, for my study of the programming of EU Funds in 
Poland 
H0: The lack of consolidation within or between the five arenas of democracy can not 
be regarded as a hindrance for ENGO participation in EU Funds.   
Hα: The lack of consolidation within or between the five arenas of democracy can be 
regarded as a hindrance for ENGO participation in EU Funds.  
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1.8 An outline of the chapters 
After a presentation of the theoretical framework for this thesis in the next chapter, I 
sketch up the historical and contemporary outline of Polish civil society and its 
environmental sector in chapter 3. In chapter 4 I turn to the methodological 
challenges that I face in this study. In chapter 5 I will introduce my case in relation to 
the European funding schemes more thoroughly, before proceeding to analyse my 
interview data and conclude that much, but not enough has happened with regards to 
democratic consolidation in Poland.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Which door to open? 
Studying ENGO participation in EU Funds is in many ways a typical governance 
study describing how the ENGOs get to act, through what types of interaction. 
Governance stems from a western liberal tradition that emerged in the late 1980s as a 
tool for understanding social coordination and the interaction between different 
arenas in society. It soon became a popular concept, as it promoted democratic values 
by perceiving power as exercised through a network of interconnected actors, not 
solely by the strong state. In the age of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, 
decentralisation and small government, such a notion was welcomed, and governance 
could therefore also evolve rapidly in the economic society (Kemp et al. 2005).  
A governance study can be approached from different theoretical platforms, and 
democratic consolidation is only one of them. A different approach would be the 
literature on institutionalism that, put briefly, discusses how the norms, rules and 
frameworks of institutions shape our society and vice versa. The actors involved in 
such policy transfer in Poland, be it bureaucrats, politicians, ENGOs or businessmen 
are all affected by their institutional affiliations as well as their self-interest, as the 
actors in Brussels are affected by theirs. The transfer of EU policy to the new post-
communist Member States in the east can easily end in failure because of institutional 
differences, with only parts of the policy implemented, policy implemented in the 
wrong way or nothing implemented at all (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Holm-Hansen 
2005). In my case concerning democratic consolidation it is a danger that the 
partnership principle ensuring broad interaction with civil society will be harder to 
implement in Poland than in Western Europe because of the communist, authoritarian 
past still holding a certain grasp on Polish political institutions.  
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I do not reject the institution theory as in fact many elements of it are found in my 
analysis, but I do close the door slightly and “zoom out” instead, trying to explain 
ENGO participation from the larger, more historical arguments concerning 
democratic consolidation. “Path dependency” is such an argument, and uses events in 
the past to explain how current societal and political structures have developed as 
they have, and how this development will continue in the future. Although this can be 
a tempting tool to use when describing the ailments of post-communism, as rules and 
norms naturally do evolve through a history-dependent process, path-dependency and 
democratic theory must not be exaggerated. The EU-8 countries have developed 
quickly since 1989 and many reforms have been carried out and new institutions 
established, clearing the way for brand new perceptions of governance.  
2.2 Democratic consolidation theory 
Discussing democracy is never easy as it is such a broad concept and thereby so 
easily flavoured by ones own political colours. It literally means “rule of the people” 
in Greek, but which people? Communist regimes even used to perceive themselves as 
more democratic than the “bourgeois” democracies in the west. I save myself the 
effort of having to design a new starting point by sticking to a widely recognised 
framework for studying democratic consolidation, even if it does rather perceive 
democracy from a western, liberal tradition. 
In a regular dictionary I find that the verb “to consolidate” has two meanings: “to 
become or make something more solid, secure or strong” and: “to unite or combine 
things into one” (Oxford University Press 1995). Democratic consolidation unites 
these two meanings with the Greek demokratia by arguing that the strengthening of 
democracy must take place in different arenas in society, and in the interaction 
between these in order to make democracy the “only game in town” (Linz & Stepan 
1996).   
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Linz & Stepan argue that democratic consolidation within and between the arenas of 
civil society, political society, rule of law, the state apparatus and economic society, 
take place at a behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional level. Behaviourally, 
consolidation is possible when no significant participants are going out of their way 
to destabilise the democracy. Attitudinally a consolidated democracy enjoys a strong 
majority of pro-democratic public opinion and political culture, while constitutional 
consolidation means that the different players within a state are all more or less 
subjected and habituated to the rules, laws and procedures that the democratic game 
entails (Linz & Stepan 1996:6–7). 
Ekiert and Kubik also focus on different levels, when they procedurally approach 
democratic consolidation as the completion of certain conditions. The first, “political” 
condition concerns democratic transition and is essential for any degree of 
consolidation, while the others conditions are realisable in various degrees, with their 
absence making democracy weak and unstable.  
1. Political democracy must be in place with free and fair elections, broad 
political participation and political and civil liberties like freedom of speech 
and to join organisations.  
2. There must be a consensus about “stateness”, the territorial boundaries of the 
political community and who should be its citizens.  
3. Transparency and predictability must be developed at the institutional level, 
with rule of law assured by the constitution, a state monopoly of certain means 
and powers giving it the capacity to implement its policies, and clear 
boundaries between the state and other institutional domains of the democratic 
polity like civil society and the political party system.     
4. A sufficient level of social and cultural democratisation must be achieved, in 
the sense that the institutional setup of the democracy and its political 
procedures must be considered legitimate by all in society (Ekiert & Kubik 
1999:78).  
It is important to note that democratic consolidation in theory can be regarded as an 
everlasting process of strengthening the interaction between different arenas in 
society. There will always be room for improvement in the EU-8 as within all EU-25, 
and every other state in the world, especially regarding the less formal cultural and 
social conditions, providing democratic legitimacy and good practices. Formalising 
the concept by relating to conditions and societal arenas is a good idea however, since 
it makes democratic consolidation graspable and possible to study.   
Poland and the other EU-8 are expected to have a hard time fulfilling these conditions 
for democratic consolidation as they are still young democracies. EU has and is still 
playing an important part in this democratisation process by presupposing 
consolidation as necessary for EU membership, hence the Copenhagen Criteria, and 
important for the best possible implementation of EU policy in the Member States. 
The EU Funds are elements of such policy and they relate to all the 5 arenas of 
democratic consolidation, as presented in Figure 2.1 below.  
Rule of Law
Civil SocietyPolitical Society 
Economic Society State Apparatus 
 
Figure 2.1 The relationships between the arenas of democratic 
consolidation.  
I choose to include all the five arenas in my analysis since I feel they are all 
interesting with regard to my case concerning ENGOs in civil society. A different 
approach would have been to only concern my model with the “main” political 
realms of civil society, political society and state apparatus, as Ekiert and Kubik do in 
their study of Polish civil society, and rather perceive rule of law and the economic 
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society as underlying arenas that are in any case touched upon (1999). “Rule of law” 
is important for my analysis since many decisions about partnership are based on 
Polish and EU legislation. “The economic society” is central to the discussion on 
environmental sustainability and economic growth. In the context of the 5 arenas 
from figure 2.1, I will continue below to discuss democratic consolidation, describing 
them and their interaction with each other in Poland.  
2.2.1 Political society 
The political society is the arena where the right to exercise control over public 
power and the state apparatus is contested and  where social interest is aggregated, 
arranged and translated into policy recommendations (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:82; Linz 
& Stepan 1996:8) A political society is necessary in order to select and monitor a 
democratic government, and full consolidation in this arena means general positive 
appreciation and use of political institutions like parties, elections, political 
leadership, but also collaboration with the other arenas, especially civil society. 
Authoritarianism kills political society with its in effectively single party system, and 
it is hard after the transition to reinstate a lively and diverse political society. People 
in post-communist Europe have learnt to be distrustful of political institutions and 
stay away from politics, and the lack of democracy has hindered the development of a 
stable party political landscape that gives voters clear alternatives to choose between. 
Consolidation of the political society plays an important role here, creating platforms 
for democratic participation and stimulating the use of these and thus creating norms 
and routines for exercising democratic power (Linz & Stepan 1996:7–15).  
Poland has also had to set up a new political society and create an electoral system 
and new political parties. There have been 5 completely free parliamentary elections 
from 1991 until 2005 in addition to the 1989 round table “compromise” between 
Solidarity and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), and a total of 10 different 
governments. When the electoral system was created at the end of communism in 
Poland, a majority party system of proportional representation was chosen, but with 
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no minimum threshold. It was easy to register a political party for national elections, 
as only 15 members were needed, and after the 1991 elections 29 parties created a 
highly fragmented Sejm, some with names such as Party X and Beer Lovers’ Party. 
In 1993 a 5 % threshold and the D’Hondt method of allocating seats to parties at 
district and national tiers was implemented as a stabilising measure, and from 1997 a 
new law stated that a party needs 1000 members in order to partake in national 
elections (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:57–58; Ferry & Rüdig 2002).  
Today the political party system is relatively stable as a result, with largely the same 
parties running in the 2001 and 2005 elections. Another reason for this stability can 
be that the liberal form of communism and the strong anti-communist civil society 
gave Poles a head start in rediscovering political cleavages and party identifications 
after 1989, and thus aided the creation of today’s political spectrum. The main 
political cleavages in Poland are the different views on how to deal with the 
communist past, opening the polish economy to foreign influence, and governance 
issues. In the context of a slightly confusing mix and match of nationalism, 
Catholicism, socialism and liberalism, the Polish political party spectrum is created. 
This spectrum consists of a clerical-nationalist right-wing, the non-populist right, the 
liberal centre, the agrarian parties and the left-wing (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:165; 
Holm-Hansen 2002:97). The 9 main parties that represent this spectrum are listed in 
Table 2.1 below. Seven of these met the 5 % threshold in the 2005 elections and are 
therefore currently in the Sejm. 
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Table 2.1 The Polish political party spectrum after the 2005 
parliamentary elections 
Name of party Description                               (economic 
policy/values) 
% of votes 
2005 
League of Polish Families (LPR) populist protectionist / ultra-Catholic, 
nationalist  
8 % 
Law and Justice (PiS) Protectionist, anti-corruption / Catholic 
conservative 
27 % 
Civic Platform (PO) liberal / moderately conservative 24.1 % 
The Democratic Party (Demokraci.pl) social liberal / liberal 2.5 % 
Polish People’s Party (PSL) agrarian protectionist / conservative 7 % 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) social democratic, ex-communist / liberal 
values  
11.3 % 
Social Democratic Party (SDPL) Splinter party from SLD, anti-corruption / 
liberal values 
3.9 % 
Self Defence (Samoobrona) agrarian, populist protectionist / 
nationalist 
11.4 % 
(Source: Kurczewski 2003:165–167; National Electoral Commission 
2005; Szeczerbiak 2003) 
This stability in the Polish party system is not necessarily followed by stable voting 
patterns, known as low electoral volatility. Such volatility is expected to be high in 
the EU-8 countries since the creation of political cleavages and voters’ party 
identification takes time (Bakke 2002:20). In Poland, a large number of voters are 
“switching sides” and voting for the moderate left- and right-wing parties at every 
other election, choosing alternate governments every 4 years. High volatility is only 
really found for the smaller, extremist and populist parties, namely the League of 
Polish Families and Self Defence, whose percentages of the total number of votes 
haven’t changed more than 3–4 % from 2001 to 2005 (National Electoral 
Commission 2005).10
                                              
10 In contrast SLD went from having 40 % and winning the elections in 2001, to having 11 % in 2005. 
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In 2005 the two largest parties to the centre of Polish politics, Law and Justice (PiS) 
and Civic Platform (PO) won approximately 27 and 24 % of the votes each, but when 
coalition talks broke down, PiS decided to create a minority government with the 
support from the ultra-conservative League of Polish Families and populist, 
isolationist Self Defence. These three parties eventually formed a majority coalition 
government on 5 May 2006. This has brought worries to people in the centre and to 
the left of Polish politics, increasing the distrust in political society (National 
Electoral Commission 2005).  
Distrust in political society 
Political distrust is obvious in post-communist Poland, and apart from the Presidents 
of the Third Polish Republic, who have all enjoyed support from a majority of Poles 
who even wish them more power (CBOS 2005a), trust in political institutions has 
been minimal since the end of communism. The parliament, political parties, the 
cabinet, senate and judiciary are all distrusted by a majority of Poles, with less than 
10 % trusting members of parliament and political parties. The army, media, local 
authorities and police on the other hand, are institutions that are trusted by a majority. 
The trend is similar in the other EU-8, and shows that there is a legacy of deep-rooted 
distrust in politics, and regular perceptions of the political class as corrupt, selfish, 
inefficient and incompetent in these countries (CBOS 2004). Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) exemplifies this distrust. Yearly 
the feelings of business people and country analysts are sampled, and in 2004 Poland 
squeezed in between Peru and Sri Lanka as the sixty-ninth least corrupt country the 
world (Transparency International 2004).11  
The same trend is shown in the Eurobarometer, where only 30 % of Poles declare 
they are satisfied with how democracy works in their country, compared to 61 % of 
Germans and 91 % in Denmark, with the EU-25 average at 57 % On the other hand, a 
 
11 In 2004 Poland received an overall score of 3.5 where 10 was “highly clean”. In 2005 the score had crept up to 3.6 
(Transparency International 2004). 
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majority of Poles are satisfied with EU democracy and have confidence in European 
Union institutions, NATO and the UN (Eurobarometer 2005; CBOS 2005a).12  
A depressing feature of the lack of trust in political institutions and the state 
bureaucracy is that it does not seem to be improving with EU membership. The 
percentage of respondents who felt the political situation in 2005 was “good” in a 
survey performed by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) even dropped 
slightly after EU membership in May 2004 to below 5 %. The economic situation is 
seen as a little better, as 10 % now feel the economic situation is good, a figure that 
has doubled in two years (CBOS 2005b).  
What does this political distrust stem from? As phrased by Linz and Stepan: “Forty-
five years of party-state rule in Eastern Europe and more than seventy in the Soviet 
Union have given the very word ‘party’ a negative connotation throughout the 
region” (1996:247). Although democratisation has taken place, the old members of 
the communist party organisation are still around in the political society and state 
apparatus. This is especially true in countries where one did not have a clean break 
with communism, such as in Poland, where the roundtable negotiations in 1989 left 
65 % of the Sejm in the hands of the PZPR until the 1991 elections (ibid.:272–273). 
Solidarity therefore had an incentive to maintain a unified, anti-political movement 
for a few more years after 1989, continuing to play on the “us” of Polish civil society 
against “them”, the communist dominated political society. This hindered the early 
creation of a diverse and interest based political society and maintained the distrust of 
the same society (ibid.).  
2.2.2 Rule of law 
Rule of law is another indispensable part of a consolidated democracy, granting the 
civil and political societies their independence and autonomy. Likewise these 
 
12 The following question was asked: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in your country/EU”. A total of 52 % are satisfied with how democracy works in 
the EU. 52 % tend to trust the EU Parliament while 58 % tend to trust the Commission (Eurobarometer 2005). 
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societies must, to a certain extent, be embedded in this same rule of law and its “spirit 
of constitutionalism”. Such a spirit requires a strong consensus on the constitution, a 
broad legal culture in all parts of society and a clear hierarchy of laws interpreted by 
an independent judicial system. The rule of law in a state then creates norms that 
make the actions of individuals and the interactions between the different arenas 
discussed here legitimate and predictable. Although plenty of rules and laws exist in 
authoritarian regimes, the constitutional spirit representing an independent, 
predictable judiciary and liberal democratic values is missing, as is the possibility of 
constraining or binding the leader or the party-state. All this makes it difficult to 
consolidate a strong legal culture in the government, civil society and business sector 
once the initial freedom is won (Linz & Stepan 1996:10–15, 248–9).  
Poland has an old rather than long tradition of constitutionalism, with its May 
Constitution of 1791 claiming to be the first modern constitution in Europe. The final 
partition of Poland in 1795 rendered the constitution useless, and for the next 123 
years Poles developed different legal codes and democratic traditions in the Prussian, 
Russian and Austrian parts, with strong assimilation policies in Prussia and Russia 
and relaxed semi-independence in the Austrian south. The Russian regime was also 
more brutal and undemocratic than the Austrian and Prussian, especially after the 
failed Polish January Uprising in 1863, sending Polish dissidents to Siberia if need 
be. As a result, political life in Russian Poland was clandestine and underground, 
while constitutional reforms and rule of law in Prussia and Austrian Poland allowed 
for some political mobilisation and participation (Åberg & Sandberg 2002:64). All 
these years apart, with different political systems and cultural influences made it 
difficult to consolidate a strong republic after the First World War, and the 
constitution of the Second Polish republic lasted only 5 years, from 1921 until 
Piłsudski’s coup in 1926 (Davies 2001).   
Democratic transition to rule of law and the casting off of the old communist heritage 
from the Peoples Republic of Poland (PRL) has not been straightforward, having 
taken the best part of the 1990s. The so-called Little Constitution of 1992, making 
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amendments to the PRL constitution of 1952 in order to regulate electoral procedures, 
was the first step. In 1995 a constitutional commission was appointed and set about 
discussing what the new constitution and character of Poland should be. Although 
there was right-wing squabbling about the new constitution lacking a national, 
Catholic soul, the referendum on 25 May 1997 accepted the new Polish Constitution. 
With this constitution parliamentary democracy was strengthened as the power of the 
President was weakened and the army and judiciary de-politicised (Davies 2001:426).  
The development of rule of law in the Third Polish republic has had the advantage of 
having EU membership as a major incentive for creating a good legal framework that 
corresponds to the accession criteria from Copenhagen and the rest of the Acquis. On 
the other hand, the consolidation of a strong legal culture, encompassing the whole of 
society will take a long time, and it is to be expected that Poland still has weaknesses, 
for example in its administrative law for implementing EU Funds. 
A vague legal framework 
A joint EU/OECD report from 2002 concerning the flaws of Polish public 
administration procedures discusses rule of law and blames a vague legal framework. 
This renders the general public helpless when dealing with the public 
administration, which frequently pays little respect to the principles of 
the rule of law. However, this situation has its origins in a legal 
framework that often is incoherent, vague and unstable both in 
procedural and substantive terms (EU/OECD 2002:5). 
The report points to different things, some of which will have greatly improved in the 
years since the report was written. The quality of the legislation was generally low in 
2002, legal texts lacked clarity, were imprecise and had many loopholes. Little notice 
was taken of existing regulations before creating new ones, adding to the confusion. 
Since the quality of legislation was low, a great number of amendments had to be 
hastily adopted after a regulation had been published (ibid.:5–6).  
The report was also very critical about the lack of access to public information, 
previously dependent on the whims of individual public officials. This was greatly 
improved with the Law on Access to Public Information that came into force on 1 
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January 2002. The convenience of the internet has together with this new law 
improved the situation dramatically (ibid.:6).   
Complicated and vague legislation is also one the main criticisms of Poland in the 
USAID 2004 NGO sustainability index, focusing on how difficult it is to register 
such organisations: 
The freedom of assembly is a civic right guaranteed by the constitution, 
but the mandatory process of registering an organization in the National 
Court Register is dissuasive — it involves protracted court proceedings, 
very complex administrative procedures, and high registration fees 
(USAID 2005:197). 
The report also criticises the fact that the state apparatus too rarely considers the 
opinions of the NGO sector, even if the freedom of the organisations to address 
matters of public debate also is guaranteed by law (ibid.:197). This shows clearly that 
theory and practice are two entirely different things when it comes to discussing the 
implementation of rule of law, and must therefore be considered individually when 
studying ENGO participation in EU funding. 
2.2.3 State apparatus  
A state bureaucracy is necessary in order to protect the rights of the citizens and 
implement the basic services that these citizens demand and the laws and procedures 
established by the political society. In a consolidated democracy this apparatus needs 
to work in accordance with the rule of law, it must be efficient and independent of the 
other arenas, but with their support. Civil society must support the fact that the state 
bureaucracy has monopoly in some areas, the political society must agree on a system 
that can raise taxes for the state apparatus, while the economic society produces the 
taxable surplus to finance this bureaucracy (Linz & Stepan 1996:10–15). 
Political independence?  
In post-communist Europe it is natural to discuss the functionality of the state 
bureaucracy for the new democratic regime, since authoritarianism obliterates the 
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independence of this arena from the political sphere. Although a politicised 
bureaucracy is not confined to authoritarian states, the problems of democratically 
consolidating the state apparatus in a country that has not previously had a culture for 
a transparent and independent bureaucracy is apparent. Poland is no exception, as 
shown above by its high ranking on Transparency International’s index of perceived 
corruption. This is partly the result of resistant stereotypes created within the “us” 
versus “them” dichotomy, with the state apparatus still perceived as dominated by ex-
communist apparatchiks with their old-fashioned and inefficient ways. Formally 
though, things have changed since communism, as exemplified by article 153 of the 
new constitution, guarding an independent civil service:  
A corps of civil servants shall operate in the organs of government 
administration in order to ensure a professional, diligent, impartial and 
politically neutral discharge of the State's obligations (The Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland 1997). 
With the National School of Public Administration (KSAP) set up in 1990 and with 
the new Civil Service Act that came into force in 1999, effort has been made to make 
the recruitment of civil servants more transparent, competitive and merit based, and 
to improve the training of government employees. This has been done to increase 
professionalism in government and to reduce politically biased appointments. 
Unfortunately, the new and superior recruitment policy with six-month trial periods 
and extensive examinations is only found at a national government level, and the 
traditional, politically biased appointments are still seen as a problem within regional 
and local government. This is unfortunate since de-centralisation policy has meant 
more decision making is taking place at these levels than before (EU/OECD 2002:7–
8).  
The new training schemes and especially KSAP are great stimulus for getting young 
and intelligent professionals to enter government offices, and slowly take over and 
eradicate the post-communist culture that still holds the Polish public in its grasp. 
Salaries in government jobs are usually lower than what the business sector can offer 
while the frustrations of working in this sector are perceived as higher. For this 
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reason many ambitious and clever university graduates find it more attractive to work 
in the private sector in Poland, and of the young people who do enter public 
administration, the danger is that many solely use it as a stepping stone to acquire 
work experience, before hopping over to well-paid jobs in the private sector 
(Bartoszewicz interview). 
Theory and practice 
Another point of criticism is that secondary legislation to policy such as the well-
intended Civil Service Act has not always been properly developed or enforced in 
many areas, revealing a gap between theory and practice. Regulation of procedures 
for exposing corruption or other wrongdoings, and legal protection for civil servants 
who dare to do so, had not been implemented when the EU/OECD report was 
published in 2002. There was also much unpredictability regarding salary schemes in 
the civil service, granting managers too much power in determining individual wages 
(EU/OECD 2002). 
There are different reasons for these gaps between the intentions of new policies and 
the practical workings of them. The rush to implement a great deal of new legislation 
during a phase of democratic consolidation, such as in the 15 years between the end 
of communism and Poland joining the EU, will naturally cause “pro-forma” 
situations, where the practical implementation lags behind the legal act. One of the 
reasons for this is that the often ambivalent relationships between politicians and the 
professional civil servants in the government sometimes results in these civil servants 
being sidestepped by the politicians and their advisors when designing a new policy. 
The later translation of the policy into an administrative action plan is more difficult 
than if the civil servants are informed and actively taking part all along (ibid:15).   
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2.2.4 Economic society 
Modern consolidated economies require a set of socio-politically 
crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and 
regulations, which we call economic society, that mediates between 
state and market (Linz & Stepan 1996:11). 
Empirically there is also a strong case to be made for the link between market 
capitalism and liberal democracy being important since no consolidated democracies 
are command economies in times of peace. China is an example that you can 
combine authoritarianism with capitalism, but conventional theory and Western 
history asserts that the industrialisation process in the long run necessitates a more 
highly educated population and complex division of labour that tends to support the 
development of liberal democratic institutions and the material base for the pluralism 
and autonomy of these arenas. On the other hand no free market is perfectly 
maintained without laws and norms, and consolidated democracies therefore require 
socio-political regulations and institutions that govern the economy. Put in a different 
way, democratic consolidation entails dialogue between society and the government 
regarding public goods, while such goods do not exist in an extreme free market 
economy (Fukuyama 1996: 356–361; Linz & Stepan 1996:11–12). 
Post-communist societies have to establish democratic political institutions without 
the capitalist economic system to back them up. This can be hard since it is often the 
firms, markets and competition that provide the critical form of social backing for the 
proper functioning of democratic institutions (Fukuyama 1996). Likewise the 
rejuvenation of capitalism and the free market requires these democratic institutions 
and especially social capital in the underlying society permitting the self-organisation 
of business, corporations and networks (ibid.). Poland had a strong civil society at the 
end of communism, and was able to start economic reforms early. Finance Minister 
Leszek Balcerowicz introduced a shock therapy in late 1989, in order to curb the 
hyperinflation and rapidly introduce liberal market economy. The result was early 
and successful privatisation, rapid GDP growth and foreign investment in the 
business sector. Heavy industry created greater difficulties after the fall of 
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communism, due to the collapse of its large Soviet market, and Poland suddenly 
experienced mass unemployment and a reduction in the average standard of living 
(Sanford 1997:180). 
Post-communist disappointment 
The economic and social hardship that occurred after the initial, momentous and 
optimistic feat of ending communism, bred cynicism and disillusionment with social, 
economic and political development, and is often referred to as “post-communist 
disappointment” (Howard 2003a). This disappointment prepares the ground for 
populist politicians who argue for increased isolationism and economic patriotism. 
Too much economic liberalism is seen as part of the problem, morally degenerating 
Poles, robbing them of their Catholic values, and having made the nomenklatura13 
and the foreign businessmen rich, while many hard working and honest Poles are 
poor and unemployed (Garton Ash 1999; Ost 2005).  
The economic hardship and reinstallation of class divisions with the disproportionate 
spread of wealth in post-communist societies can also be somewhat detrimental to the 
development of civil society and can help explain both the drop in civic participation 
and interpersonal trust throughout the 1990s. People who are finding it hard to get by, 
either they’re unemployed or have several jobs, can not be expected to find the time 
or energy for extensive civil societal activities, and combined with general distrust in 
organisational membership stemming from forced participation in work-place 
activities during communism and the later crumbling of the Solidarity movement 
after 1989, many Poles and other EU-8 nationals are expected to stay away from 
organisational activity (Howard 2003a). An increase in organised crime, drug abuse 
and violence in Poland after 1989 can also be seen as a result of market liberalisation 
opening the borders to new foreign troubles that the weakened state apparatus, e.g. 
 
13 Originally nomenklatura was used in the Soviet Union for a list of jobs or positions whose appointments had to be 
approved by the Communist Party since they involved high responsibility. The word later developed into a figurative term 
describing the stratified, privileged class in Communist Europe. Naturally this well-educated and experienced class, with its 
networking and managerial skills has fared better through the democratic transition than many other groups in Poland, even 
without corrupt behaviour. (Davies 2001:31-32).      
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the police, is not capable to deal with. This fear of criminality and lawlessness can 
help explain the reduction in general interpersonal trust in Poland since the end of 
communism, and the increased focus on such issues in the political society, with PiS 
now in power. It is time to discuss civil society and its position in Poland in detail. 
2.3 Civil society 
2.3.1 A kind of definition 
Although the vague notion of “civil society” is age-old and dates back to early 
discussions of democracy and citizenship in the classical Greek polis, the concept of 
civil society as we know it today derives from European eighteenth century 
enlightenment with the philosophers of this period spreading modern democratic 
ideas and paving the way for the first wave of democratisation in the nineteenth 
century, by developing liberalism and freeing individuals and their capital from the 
grasp of the absolute Monarch. By the nineteenth century however philosophers like 
Hegel and Marx were picking holes in the liberal design and its individualist and 
capitalist view of community. Hegel believed in a more ideological driving force 
behind the individual interaction in a State than pure market capitalism as proposed 
by liberalism, and introduced civil society as one of three main arenas of interaction 
for individuals, besides the family and the state, and an abstract concept of “ethical 
life” motivating this interaction. Marx on the other hand saw the world as materialist, 
but wanted to do something radically about it and regarded civil society with its 
social class system, as the arena where change would need to happen with workers 
uniting. Variations of this debate have more or less continued ever since, as 
exemplified by the communitarian and liberal dichotomy14 at the end of the twentieth 
 
14 The debate started as a communitarian critique of what is seen as liberal citizenship’s slightly negative and defensive 
view being too protective of the individual against the state, rather than focusing on the “thick” notion of the individual 
being obliged to take part in society. The debate has been central to the discussions of the decline of civil society in the 
western hemisphere (Faulks 1999:136-140).     
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century. Civil society has thus emerged as a societal sphere, distinctively set apart 
from the State, but also from the marketplace, where interaction between individuals 
happens for different reasons at different levels of abstraction (Cohen & Arato 1992: 
91–102; Faulks 1999). 
The Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics tries to capture this 
multifaceted concept with the following working definition of civil society:  
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around 
shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms 
are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in 
practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market 
are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying 
in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are 
often populated by organisations such as registered charities, 
development non-governmental organisations, community groups, 
women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional 
associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, 
business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (London School 
of Economics 2004). 
2.3.2 Civil society and democratisation 
Civil society is a practical concept when discussing democratisation, as it importantly 
focuses on how systems of cooperation can be built from below. Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s nineteenth century perception of such society being important for the 
building of democracy in America is an early contribution to such democratisation 
literature. He argued that the many Americans participating in numerous and 
extensive voluntary organisations fostered cooperation and trust, which again was 
essential for the successful functioning of the young American democracy (Inglehart 
1997:224). Similarly, civil society has enjoyed a renaissance during the fall of 
communism in Europe, as autonomous pressure-groups like the Solidarity movement 
in Poland proved that political mobilisation in opposition to the communist regime 
was both possible and rewarding. Collective action and democratisation could happen 
from below, and the historical events at the Gdańsk shipyard helped reinstate civil 
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society as an important factor for democratisation (Cohen and Arato 1992:31–36; 
Howard 2003b:31).  
The renaissance of civil society at the “end of history” is also related to the beginning 
of a new era. Globalisation, new technology and greater intercultural exchange 
created arguments for huge societal and economic adjustments that also favour the 
strengthening of the third sector. These arguments vary from pragmatic, capitalist 
measures regarding the strengthening of civil society as a way of minimising 
government spending and thereby competing more efficiently in the global 
marketplace, to the “globally thinking, locally acting” political activists, using new 
technology and civil society engagement as way of combating the evil perils of this 
same globalisation (World Resources Institute 2004). 
2.3.3 Civil society at an organisational and an individual level  
As has already been established, discussing the well functioning democracy can focus 
on the interaction between civil society and the other four mutually reinforcing 
conditions posed by Linz and Stepan. It is at this “institutional” level we find most of 
the studies of post-communist democratisation. These usually regard civil society 
foremost as the arena of different self-organised organisations or institutions that 
were important for the breakdown of communism, but that today works at preserving 
an autonomous public sphere that can check and balance the activities of the State in 
the young democracy (Kaldor & Vejvoda 1999:17; Linz & Stepan 1996).  
My case study from the Polish ENGO milieu retains such an approach to civil 
society, studying these organisations’ participation in EU Funds in a democratic 
consolidation framework. This participation can be operationalised by  focusing on 
three main areas identified by Howell as central for strengthening civil society: 1.) 
“Institution and capacity-building”, aiding the creation of CSOs and supporting these 
with the technical advice and training necessary for building effective organisations, 
in addition to encouraging the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks 
helping this. 2.) Encouraging “partnerships and coalitions” between state, market and 
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civil society, and thereby bringing different areas of society closer together. 3.) 
Securing “financial sustainability” of civil society by making sure the material basis 
for the organisational activity is in place. In reality, Howell argues: “these 
approaches are not neatly separated from one another as developing partnerships 
might also require capacity-building and financing mechanisms” (2000:7).  
In addition to an institutional level it is important to study civil society at an 
individual citizen level, since most citizens do not even belong to any organisations, 
and at the end of the day organisations consist of people with their individual 
opinions, agendas and experiences. Civil society at an individual citizen level can be 
perceived as a type of social space or sphere and relates to citizens’ values and 
behavioural orientations towards politics and the people around them (Gibson 
2003:61–62). Contemplating civil society as such a social space is especially 
important in post-communist regimes, since independent organisations were usually 
banned under communism. A strict institutional level focus will in these cases not 
give a complete picture of civil society and its importance for democratic 
consolidation as such a society formally did not exist during communism.  
Social capital 
Social capital is such civil society at an individual citizen level and can be defined as:  
Features of social life — networks, norms, and trust — that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives...Social capital in short, refers to social connections and the 
attendant norms and trust” (Putnam 1995:664–665).  
Whitehead reasons that the “capital” part of social capital makes the concept easier to 
grasp than “civil society” since we can relate it to economics and finance, where 
capital can be machines used to make goods, or financial assets held in order to 
generate more income (2002:67). Figuratively speaking then, social capital is a stock 
of resources, like norms and trust, which can enhance the social effectiveness in 
society while generating more social capital.  
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In his influential study Making Democracy Work Putnam argues that there is a 
historical path dependency between civil society at an institutional and a citizen level, 
and that the greater amount of social capital between individuals in Northern Italy can 
explain why this region is richer and more democratically consolidated than Southern 
Italy today. While Southern Italy stayed poor, authoritarian and feudal after the 
Middle Ages with a vertical “client–patron” hierarchy, independent city states started 
to develop in Northern Italy, and built their wealth and institutions on trade and 
cooperation. This has developed trust between people, and participation in the many 
different horizontal networks has given a collective spirit to Northern Italian 
communities, which in turn has facilitated better government, greater prosperity and a 
stronger civil society than in the south (Putnam et al. 1993).  
Similar historic path dependent analyses have been done in post-communist societies, 
where a low level of civic participation and social capital is perceived as a result of 
communism being detrimental to the development of a lively civil society  (Howard 
2003b). Poland is an interesting case since it has both a strong civil society heritage 
and a communist past, and a discussion on Polish civil society will follow in the next 
chapter. 
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3. Polish Civil Society  
3.1 The historical legacy 
Poland’s historical legacy is rich and fascinating. The geographical position in the 
heart of Europe, between the great powers of Germany and Russia, has meant that 
Poland has played an important role in European history, sometimes in a way that one 
could never wish for. Countless wars have been fought on Polish soil, millions of 
lives have been taken and much of the great economic and intellectual wealth built, 
was later squandered and reduced to rubble. After the partitions of the country by 
Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary at the end of the eighteenth century, the Polish 
state ceased to exist for over a hundred years. Independence was regained in 1918, 
and Poland was ready to blossom again, as it had done for centuries past.15 In many 
ways it did, and despite international economic crisis Poland achieved significant 
economic growth in between the wars. Politically, this “Second Republic” was more 
troubled. Neighbourly border-squabbles had to be dealt with, and a nation split by 
three culturally different empires for more than a hundred years had to be reintegrated 
into one common Polish state that had one-third national minorities among its 
populace.16 Though a Polish constitution was agreed on in 1921, by May 1926 the 
political scene was so chaotic that war hero Józef Piłsudski found it best to overthrow 
the government by a military coup in order to save Poland from chaos and collapse. 
From then on, until the end of the Cold War 63 years later, authoritarianism in some 
form or another was the order of the day in Poland. The experience of the Second 
Republic, and even Piłsudski himself, is retrospectively seen as a central part of 
Polands democratic heritage, and became a ray of light during later oppression, 
 
15 From the mid-sixteenth century until the partitions in the 1790s, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with its 
“aristocratic democracy” and multi-cultural population, was a hegemonic power in Central Europe (Michta 1997:69).  
16 In 1931 the largest national minorities in Poland were the estimated 5 million Ukrainians, 3 million Jews, 2 million 
Byelorussians and 800.000 Germans, of a total population of 35 million people (Iglicka 2000). 
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showing that national sovereignty and western-style democracy is possible in Poland 
(Davies 2001; Michta 1997).  
On 1 September 1939 the Second World War officially began when the German 
battleship Schleswig-Holstein began shelling the military garrison at Westerplatte in 
Poland, an ally of France and Britain. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939 
had already sealed Poland’s future — yet another partition between Germany and 
Russia.17 The war took almost six million Polish lives in all, which was a fifth of the 
pre-war population and included most of the three million Polish Jews. In addition to 
a horrific death toll, many of the biggest cities were utterly destroyed and the whole 
of Poland was geographically moved westwards, gaining German areas east of the 
river Oder but losing its eastern part to the USSR. These new post-war borders meant 
that millions of people were forcefully moved and expected to make new lives for 
themselves hundreds of kilometres from home. As if that wasn’t enough, the Yalta 
summit in February 1945 gave Stalin the power to draw the iron curtain before 
Poland’s eyes, submerging the country into 44 years of communism (Davies 2001; 
Michta 1997).  
Foreign oppression has played a central part in modern Polish history, especially in 
the epochs that are regarded as so important for European nation building. The 
nineteenth century is such an era, as nationalism bonded citizens and helped the “first 
wave”18 of democratisation that created many of the European states we know today. 
The American and French revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century gave way 
to democratic ideals, as the growing gaps between new social classes created by 
industrialisation gave radical ideas to the impoverished people living in town slums. 
 
17 This pact, a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, included a secret agreement that the two 
superpowers would “carve up” and divide the independent countries geographically situated between their own empires 
between themselves (Davies 2001).   
18 Huntington defines waves of democratisation as: “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that 
occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that 
period” (Huntington 1991:15). The waves are usually followed by periods of reversed, democratic breakdown, and the first 
wave of democratisation in the nineteenth century was followed by a democratic breakdown in 1922-1942 (Huntington 
1991). 
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Nineteenth century nationalism was all sewn together by technology and culture, by 
improved accessibility to printed newspapers and books, an increasingly literate 
public, and a ruling class giving democratic concessions and stimulating nationalist 
values in order to thwart new revolutionary ideas, brewing among the working 
classes. There was plenty of Polish nationalism in this period too, but no state to 
attach it (Davies 2001).  
The story is a similar one after the Second World War, when Europe was at the stage 
of physical and mental rebuilding. This rebuilding in Poland was taking place 
involuntarily under Stalinist rule and involved the weakening of Polish nationalism 
by harassment, incarceration or execution of political foes of the communist regime. 
Many of these were active in the strong Polish resistance movement and Home Army 
(AK) during the war, and falsely accused of collaboration with the Nazis. By the end 
of 1948 over 8000 people had been killed, 150,000 arrested and nearly 23,000 
sentenced by military tribunals (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:25). This persecution of 
political enemies continued for the whole continuity of the Polish Peoples Republic, 
though a more liberal form of communism was implemented when Władysław 
Gomułka became head of state in 1956. Gomułka was of the opinion that Poland 
needed to adopt its own national form of communism, linked to Polish traditions and 
its own local circumstances, rather than blindly following Soviet advisors. At the 
same time he knew that his communist regime rested on Soviet power, and so the 
deal with the Soviet Union was struck. More Polish autonomy and some liberalising 
measures, like allowing for an independent Catholic Church and elements of work-
place democracy, and not collectivising the agriculture, while not challenging the 
geopolitical interests of the USSR. The success of Gomułka’s liberalisations can be 
discussed. On the one hand the Polish People’s Republic ceased to be solely a puppet 
state as this liberal communism was easier to accept for many Poles. On the other 
hand, the liberalisations were helpful in creating the autonomous civil society in 
Poland that eventually led to the strong opposition against the regime (Davies 2001; 
Ekiert & Kubik 1999).  
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Authoritarianism was still very much the order of the day after the reforms introduced 
by Gomułka, and later by his successor in 1970, Edward Gierek. An initial period of 
scepticism and even welcoming of the benefits of reform, like freer press and travel 
quickly wore off when the populace realised that these leaders had no real incentive 
or will for actual political liberalisation in the direction of democracy. From time to 
time these realisations, together with a dire economic situation, sparked off new 
revolts and political crises, right up until the communist regime finally collapsed, 
with the Solidarity movement entering roundtable negotiations in 1989. Only then did 
foreign domination end, and Polish democratic consolidation could truly begin 
(Ekiert & Kubik 1999).19  
3.2 Polish peculiarities  
Polish civil society was able to grow so strong during communism because of certain 
historic peculiarities. The most important of these are: 1.) the existence of an 
independent Catholic Church, 2.) non-collectivised farming, and 3.) united political 
opposition (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:24; Rzeczpospolita 2006). These distinctively 
Polish peculiarities are important for explaining the many political crises that 
mobilised such large parts of the Polish population during communism, which 
eventually created the Solidarity movement and its unusual mix of proletarian 
radicalism and catholic nationalist conservatism. 
3.2.1 The Catholic Church 
The role and strength of religion in Poland is the main peculiarity, and of equal 
importance for Polish civil society and national identity.  For centuries the Catholic 
 
19 Many Polish politicians, especially populists and those on the Catholic right-wing regard this foreign domination as 
continuing with the EU attacking Polish national sovereignty and conservative values. Even politicians close to the centre 
of Polish politics can be very sceptical to EU, like Jan Rokita from PO with his “Nice or death” statement arguing firmly 
that the European Constitution must be amended, keeping the old European Council voting system from the Nice Treaty 
(Warsaw Voice 2003).  
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Church has been an institution where Poles can worship both God and Poland, in 
times when foreign domination has threatened. The strong relationship between 
Polish nationalism and Catholicism goes back to the end of the sixteenth century, 
when the Swede Zygmunt III Waza became king of both countries. This drew strong 
opposition especially in Protestant Sweden, and led to the Swedish-Polish war. Ever 
since, wars have been fought against states with different religions, and Catholicism 
has been used explicitly to forge Poles together against the foreign oppressors, be 
they Orthodox Russians and Ukrainians, Muslim Ottomans and Tatars or Protestant 
Prussians and Swedes. 
Before the turning point at the beginning of the seventeenth century Poland was a 
multicultural aristocratic democracy where the landowning nobility (Szlachta) 
controlled both the parliament (Sejm) and the king. The power and liberty enjoyed by 
the Szlachta20 was unheard of elsewhere in Europe, and the lack of an absolutist 
monarch banning all other faiths than his own, let people get on with their daily 
routines and religious practices to a larger extent in Poland than in countries with 
stronger monarchs. As a result of this, Poland became even more multicultural, as 
Jews and other marginalised religious groups fled here from persecution in other 
parts of Europe. On the other hand, the lack of a strong monarch made Poland 
vulnerable to foreign attack and led inevitably to the demise of Poland at the end of 
the eighteenth century, with the partitions by Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary. 
This experience with aristocratic democracy and its 1791 Constitution left its mark on 
Poland though, by strengthening its already “west-leaning” Roman Catholic identity 
with political aspirations: “as a bastion of Latin civilization against Byzantine 
Russia” (Michta 1997:70) 
During “occupation”, be it the partitions in the nineteenth century or the later 
experiences with Nazism and Communism, the Catholic Church further strengthened 
its role as the arena for ethnic Poles to meet, speak their language, worship their 
 
20 The Polish nobility counted 8-10% of the population. In most other European countries, except Spain, the nobility 
counted a mere 1-3 %. In the Warsaw region as many as 30 % were nobility. 
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national heroes, and dream of full Polish independence again.21 The Second World 
War was especially important since it left Poland in a thoroughly destroyed, but 
homogenous state. Ethnically, the Holocaust, the territorial adjustments to the west, 
and expulsion of Prussian, Silesian and other Germans, now meant that what had 
once been a multicultural state with a third of its inhabitants “minorities” was now 
entirely Polish. In the way of class stratification too, Poland was much more a 
homogenous peasant nation after the war, with both Nazi and Soviet “policies” 
strongly decimating the professional class, the urban intelligentsia, and the industrial 
owners/bourgeoisie (Iglicka 2000: 6; Michta 1997:71). 
All the historical bloodshed and nation-less nation building throughout the last 
centuries can be seen as having created civil society strengthening and unifying 
traditions in Poland linked to the Catholic Church, even if the Church itself has 
merely been protecting its own interests. Linz and Stepan argue that the Catholic 
Church, although it cooperated with totalitarian regimes in Spain and Portugal, is 
always a latent source of pluralism because of its trans-national hierarchy and the 
Pope’s possibility of sanctioning or withdrawing recognition of Bishops who step out 
of line. This is especially important in Poland from where the archbishop of Kraków, 
Cardinal Karol Wojtyła became Pope in 1978, as the revolutionary spirit was brewing 
in the Solidarity movement (Linz & Stepan 1996:256–262). John Paul II became an 
icon for the independent Polish civil society, and his election and triumphant visit to 
his homeland in 1979 provided “the necessary psychological uplift which broke the 
chains of fear and anxiety preventing ordinary Poles from being themselves” (Davies 
2001:15). 
 
21 The strong link between nationalism and Catholicism is shown in the mythological story of how a gang of ill-equipped 
priests and local soldiers managed to defend the Jasna Góra monastery and its holy icon of Mary with the Christ Child, 
known as the Black Madonna, from the pillaging, Protestant Swedish army during the deluge in 1655. Nobel prize winner 
Henryk Sienkiewicz wrote the book Potop, and the film version was nominated for an Oscar in 1974.   
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3.2.2 Private landownership and non-collectivised farming 
In addition to the distinct unity that Catholicism and a dramatic historical legacy has 
given Polish civil society, the fact that this society was able to grow so strong and 
oppositional under communism must also be put down to the fact that private 
ownership of land was maintained under communism, and collectivisation of 
agriculture was only successfully attempted in the newly acquired German territories 
that were repopulated by Poles from the east, after the war. About 80 % of cultivated 
land remained in the hands of individual farmers, and as a result polish peasants were 
never radicalised and the strong community spirit granted by private ownership, 
never destroyed (Davies 2001; Michta 1997; Rzeczpospolita 2006).  
3.2.3  Solidarity — united political opposition  
The different peculiarities that make up Poland’s civil society were all slowly able to 
forge a united political opposition during communism, which in the end was able to 
establish the strong Solidarity movement. The ability to overcome the social 
cleavages in a large European country in order to create unity in a movement with 10 
million members is a Polish particularity in itself and worthy of a few words. 
Communism had great trouble in finding its foothold in Poland, a main reason for 
Gomułka’s liberal brand of “national communism” introduced after 1956, the year 
when workers in Poznań revolted against the regime and more than one hundred 
people were killed. Gomułka’s reforms, that freed the Catholic Church, increased 
openness to the west in culture and science, and weakened the communist influence 
on education and the media, are seen by Ekiert and Kubik as creating “uncontrolled 
spaces” that: “became laboratories of experience that nurtured political dissent and 
opposition” (1999:31). 
Uniting this anti-communist opposition across social class boundaries was however 
more problematic, since PZPR was aware of this danger and tried to stop it. When 
Polish students and intellectuals revolted against censorship in the 1960s, reaching a 
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climax with violent demonstrations in March 1968, the communist regime stirred up 
anti-intellectualism and anti-Semitism by portraying the dissent as an agent of Jewish 
Zionism and ungrateful towards the working class. University departments were 
closed down, rebellious professors lost their jobs and students were expelled. Jews 
were severely affected by this “clean up” of academia. They could no longer find jobs 
and about 20,000 were pressured to leave Poland altogether. On another note, the 
regime’s reaction to the intellectual revolt only strengthened the anti-communist 
cause since it left no doubt that democratic reform would never be initiated “top-
down” by the authorities, and intellectuals who had previously supported socialism 
and the regime in Poland, lost their faith. In addition, the events of 1968 helped 
bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church, which had also 
been persecuted throughout the 1960s (Davies 2001; Ekiert & Kubik 1999:31–35).  
Although the Polish workers had to demonstrate alone in the major strikes of 
December 1970, where it is estimated that hundreds of people died, a group of 
intellectuals supported the workers in the 1976 strikes by founding the Committee for 
Workers’ Defense (KOR). KOR’s agenda was to assist and help free arrested strike 
leaders, and it became an important information and liaison centre for a unified and 
anti-communist civil society and stimulated the development of independent groups 
and organisations across Poland. This in turn facilitated more contact and alliance-
building between workers and intellectuals, with the Catholic Church ever present in 
the background, and culminated in the rise of the Solidarity movement that brought 
the world’s attention to Gdańsk in August 1980 (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:35–37). 
By 1980 the Polish economy was in a pretty unhealthy condition, barely held together 
by an enormous foreign debt of 20 billion dollars, equivalent to the debt of the entire 
Soviet Union (Davies 2001:14). The strikes that broke out this time were better 
planned than before and coordinated between workplaces throughout the country. 
Demands were voiced in a clear, professional and political language: the right to form 
new trade unions, freedom of expression, equality of rights and duties and the 
abolition of censorship. In mid-August the strike committee at the Lenin Shipyards in 
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Gdańsk were offered a favourable settlement of their local claim, which they rejected 
on the grounds of solidarity with fellow strikers elsewhere. It led to the August 
Agreements, signed on the last day of that month, in which government negotiators 
were obliged to meet some important demands in return for the confirmation that the 
strikers were not challenging the PZPR’s hegemonic political power. The right to 
organise in free trade unions was one of the accepted concessions, and strike 
committees from all over the country joined forces to coordinate the new independent 
trade union named Solidarity, and to elect the strike leader from Gdańsk, Lech 
Wałęsa, as its Chairman. Gripped by the participatory spirit, Poles organised 
themselves in affiliated trade unions, and Solidarity grew to become a vast umbrella 
organisation, and its distinct red and white logo became a symbol of freedom and a 
strong civil society, set apart from the communist state. Solidarity even counted a 
third of PZPR’s 3 million members among its ranks, and the threat it eventually 
became to the communist regime in Poland, led to the military coup in December 
1981, with Martial Law, mass incarcerations and a ban on Solidarity. The activity 
went underground and stayed strong until the end of communism, with the movement 
entering negotiations with the regime. The roundtable agreements, signed on 5 April 
1989 re-legalised Solidarity and allowed for semi-democratic22 elections the same 
year. Wałęsa was elected president for a five year term the following year, and in 
1991 completely free parliamentary elections were held  (Davies 2001; Ekiert & 
Kubik 1999; Garton Ash 1999). 
3.3 Civil society today? 
How can we then best portray civil society in today’s Poland, the democratically 
transitioned EU Member State with a strong Catholic faith and legacy of rebellion 
and civic participation inherited from earlier times of oppression? Certainly one 
expects civil societal change to be rather slow, taking at least one full generation to 
 
22 Solidarity and other organisations could compete for 161 (35 %) of the seats in the Sejm (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:47).  
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break down the previous patterns of thought and behaviour. On the other hand the 
transition to becoming a fully-fledged western consumer society is happening so fast. 
The fear is that development will halt in a middle position, inheriting the worst from 
both worlds — capitalist materialism within a sphere of political alienation and state 
nepotism.   
3.3.1 Polish civil society at an organisational level 
Article 12 of the new Polish constitution clearly states that:  
The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom for the creation and 
functioning of trade unions, socio-occupational organizations of 
farmers, societies, citizens' movements, other voluntary associations 
and foundations (The Constitution of the Republic of Poland 1997). 
This is just what people seem to have done. The sector has expanded rapidly and now 
spans a vast field of interests. USAID’s 2004 NGO Sustainability Index for post-
communist Europe gives Poland the second highest overall score,23 and the new 
Public Benefit and Volunteer Work Act of 24 April 2003 widens the possibility for 
civil society organisations (CSOs) to take part in implementing public policy, and 
receive financial support (USAID 2005). One of these new financial benefits is the 
law that allows citizens to donate 1% of their income tax to a favourite CSO, as long 
as this is organisation is registered with the government as a public benefit 
organisation. The initial lack of awareness about this new act when it first was 
implemented in 2003 meant that CSOs have been slow in applying for the public 
benefit status, while the taxpayers have generally not registered their 1 % 
contributions with such organisations. Public awareness of this tax assignment is 
spreading as 3340 organisations were registered as public benefit organisations in 
2004 receiving over € 10 million from this source. Still, this only represents the 
contributions from less than 4 % of the eligible taxpayers in Poland, so there is 
 
23 Polish NGO sustainability was given an overall score of 2.3, while the most consolidated country Estonia was ranked at 
2.1. In the USAID study scores from 1-3 represent consolidation, 3-5 mid-transition and 5-7 early transition. The lowest 
Polish score, 2.9, was for “financial viability” (USAID 2005).  
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massive room for improvement regarding this fundraising. On the other hand, a legal 
act on value-added tax passed in 2004 in order to harmonise with EU tax regulations, 
was detrimental to CSO-activity as these organisations had to start paying more tax 
on payments received (The Percentage Philanthropy Project 2006).  
Financial sustainability is the largest problem for civil society in Poland, and 
European funding has therefore become an important issue for CSOs. The 
organisations regard European financing as a way of extending their funding base 
from local and national government, which covered 30 % of CSO expenses in 2004. 
The 1 % tax rule should also improve matters in the long run, but the danger is that 
the public authorities reduce their support to this sector by arguing that civil society 
now enjoys this tax income. The large and professional CSOs, especially NGOs, 
seem to be able to benefit well from this new situation, taking part in pan-European 
networks and applying for project funding through all the new channels that have 
opened up as a result of EU accession. Smaller organisations are prone to 
disappointment about the new situation, not having the resources to take part in EU 
networks or funding (Śmigrowska interview; USAID 2005). This is one of the main 
reasons why the EEA countries, in setting up separate NGO-funds in the beneficiary 
States, made € 41.5 million available for strengthening civil society in Poland until 
2009. A separate SOP for civil society in the NDP for 2007–2013 was also proposed, 
but finally rejected.  
As for the statistics, there were 53,101 registered CSOs in Poland in 2004, a figure 
that must be doubled if all trade unions, voluntary fire brigades, political parties, self-
government organisations and church related activities are included. 45,891 of the 
registered CSOs are associations while 7,210 are foundations (Klon/Jawor 
Association 2004). 
A reason for the increase in the number of organisations is also a result of the 
reduction in public services since the end of communism, and a significant number of 
these social and educational organisations are affiliated to the Catholic Church. The 
largest of these new organisations is the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity. It is 
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not connected to the Catholic Church but rather set up by an eccentric TV celebrity. 
On the first Sunday of every new year a nationwide televised fundraising event is 
held, for expensive medical equipment needed in children’s hospital wards 
(Bartkowski 2003:189–192; Leś et al. 2000; USAID 2005).  
The CSOs cluster more around the big cities and in western Poland, than in rural and 
eastern areas. About half of all the organisations define their activity as within the 
sphere of recreation, sport, tourism and culture, while only 3.6 % of the organisations 
state environmental protection as their most important work. Half of the organisations 
are less than 5 years old, and many of them are small, only a quarter of them having 
more than 100 members and revenues larger than € 25,000. As for paid staff, only a 
third of the organisations have employees on their payroll (Klon/Jawor Association 
2004; USAID 2005). 
3.3.2 Polish civil society at an individual citizen level 
The statistics presented above show that a lively and broad civil society is being 
created at an organisational level. This is now also true for civil society at an 
individual citizen level, with increasing levels of trust and participation, after these 
figures dropped to low levels with post-communist hardship in the 1990s. The worry 
is that the level of political trust is still very low, as was shown in chapter 2, and that 
this form of trust does not seem likely to improve in the near future.  
As for the level of civic participation, 8 million Poles were members of organisations 
and 18 % of the population took part in some form of voluntary work in 2004, up 
from 10 % in 2001! This clearly shows that the trend of the previous decade, when 
participation sank from around 30 % in 1990, has reversed. The reasons for this can 
be that economic hardship in the 1990s meant that Poles had less time and energy to 
spare for civil society work, but just as important is the fact that people left the 
Solidarity movement and other CSOs because these had lost their relevance in a new 
post-communist era. The recent surge in voluntary work can be due to a growth in 
“civic spirit” and new organisations forming as post-communist hardship is 
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regressing, as well as the opportunities these organisations are giving students who 
need internships to gain work experience (Klon/Jawor Association 2004). 
The trend is similar for levels of general interpersonal trust, a common way of 
measuring the civic spirit of a population.24 While 35 % of Poles were generally 
trustful of other people in 1990, the level dropped to 18 % by the end of the decade, 
but had crept up to 23 % by 2004.  These figures are much lower than the Western 
European level of general trust at 40–50 % in the large countries, and over 80 % in 
Scandinavia. It is comparable to the other EU-8 Member States however, with 
Hungary and the Czech Republic enjoying 30–35 % trust in 2004. The main 
difference is that these two countries overall have strengthened their level of 
interpersonal trust since the end of communism, while it has dropped by 12 % in 
Poland between 1990 and 2004. Although one should be wary of letting such 
simplistic statistics prove too many points, the low level of interpersonal trust in 
Poland does seem to point to the same trend as the low political trust discussed 
above, that the 1990s have been difficult for post-communist democratic 
consolidation in Poland (ESS 2004; ZUMA 2006).  
3.4 Environmentalism in Poland 
Building and construction is something that the business people and 
politicians see as a driving force to achieve a better position in the EU, 
based on only one indicator, GDP. This is a tragedy (Kassenberg 
interview). 
Environmentalism was never nonexistent in the EU-8 during communism, and as in 
Western Europe one would find many people who cared about ecology and who 
therefore took part in civic activity promoting this. The links between the civil 
society and the sphere of environmentalism were cemented in Poland with the 
establishment of the Polish Ecological Club (PKE) in 1980. This was however not the 
 
24 Interpersonal trust is often measured by the percentage of respondent answering: “most people can be trusted”, with the 
remaining answer category being: “you can not be too careful” (ESS 2004).  
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beginning of attempts to secure the protection of the natural environment, which go 
back to pre-communist times and especially the founding of the Polish League for 
Nature Protection (LOP) in 1928. During communism however, the LOP and other 
ecological organisations were often supported financially by the communist regime, 
as a way of controlling these organisations or at least keeping them apolitical. PKE 
had between 2000–4000 members in the 1980s, 16 regional chapters and was the 
biggest independent ENGO in Poland. It had strong ties to the Solidarity movement, 
not the government, and brought together environmental experts, academics, lawyers, 
physicians who all shared the view that radical change in policy away from 
communist industrialisation, had to take place in order to prevent an ecological 
disaster in Poland. Placing PKE in the Solidarity camp meant merging anti-
communism with environmentalism, and resulted in PKE members being persecuted 
during Martial Law and environmental issues being discussed in an Ecology Sub-
committee during the roundtable negotiations in 1989. The linking of PKE to the 
democratisation movement strengthened environmental ideology, often perceived as 
mainly urban middleclass values, in the whole of Polish society. In surveys prior to 
the local elections in 1990, ecological slogans were second to Solidarity themed ones 
in terms of attractiveness to the electorate (Ferry & Rüdig 2002:5; Kabala 1993; 
Kozakiewicz 1996).  
With the renaissance of civil society at the end of communism, ENGOs have 
blossomed too, as there were roughly 2000 organisations by 2004 (Klon/Jawor 
Association 2004). Like many other CSOs in Poland, these are mostly small 
organisations with a local focus that can not afford to hire staff and work full time for 
the cause. Although not very financially sustainable, these small organisations are 
important for strengthening local civil society. At the top end of this ENGO milieu 
one can find well-organised and professional ENGOs that create and take part in 
national and international networks, financially sustained by an array of sources 
including international donations from the EU and American foundations, and by 
selling their consulting services to the public and private sectors. Although the extent 
to which these organisations are involved with local civil society varies, it is 
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generally these “professional” organisations that have the most capacity and interest 
in taking part in the programming of EU funds, and some of them have organised 
themselves in national and international networks and coalitions like the Coalition of 
Polish Environmental NGOs on EU Funds,  CEE Bankwatch Network and the pan-
European Coalition for Sustainable EU Funds, in order to strengthen their common 
cause. The Polish coalition consists of the Institute for Sustainable Development and 
the Institute of Environmental Economics, two smallish think tanks based in Warsaw 
and Kraków, the Polish Green Network with its local level activism in the nine 
member organisations, and the national branch of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  
These organisations are actively taking part in EU planning and monitoring of EU 
Funds and are naturally also the employees of my interviewees.  
Before proceeding to the case study of such ENGO participation in EU Funds, it is 
important to contemplate the general situation regarding environmentalism in Poland, 
as a living ideology or a short lived fad that died out with Solidarity in the 1990s.  
3.4.1 Polish attitudes towards environmentalism 
Apart from the financial sustainability of these organisations, the biggest threat to this 
sector is found at an individual citizen level, where statistics are showing growing 
apathy and disinterest in environmentalism. In one survey the number of Poles 
claiming to be “pro-ecological” shrank from 34 % in 1992 to 16 % in 2004. In the 
same survey a similar drop took place for the number of Poles who could name one 
or more national environmental organisations, from 64 % in 1992 to 40 % in 2004. 
The most obvious reason for this is that the modernisation of infrastructure and the 
closing of the polluting factories has diminished the environmental problems and 
thereby reduced citizens’ worries. When the respondents were asked in 1992 to rank 
the greatest threats to civilisation, “pollution” took first place together with “crime”. 
By 2004 pollution was beaten by crime, drugs and cancer, and was ranked fourth 
together with alcoholism, just ahead of terrorism. The number of respondents who 
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replied that they lived in a polluted place showed the same trend, with approximately 
half the respondents stating this in 1992, and less than a third in 2004 (Burger 2005).  
Another important reason can be that the horrific unemployment level created by the 
modernisation of Poland makes people more pragmatically interested in economic 
development, often regarded as a trade off with environmentalism. In 1992 58 % 
thought it worth closing a very polluting factory even if it would cause 
unemployment. By 2004 this figure had sunk to 46 % of the respondents. The drop is 
similar for respondents who agree with the statement that it is important to prioritise 
environmental safety even if it harms economic development, from 32 % in 1992 to 
20 % in 2004. On the other hand an issue such as recycling seems to be increasingly 
popular in 2004, with only 12 % responding that they never segregate any of their 
garbage, down from 25 % in 2000 (Burger 2005).  
The lack of knowledge about environmentalism is an issue in Poland with 25 % of 
the population stating that they know nothing or little about ecology and only 11 % 
replying that they know a lot. What people know is usually learned through the 
media, and as many as 77 % of the respondents can not remember having seen, heard 
or read about any important environmental issues during the last month (Burger 
2005). Reasons for this can be that journalists are equally ignorant of environmental 
issues or do not feel they are as important as issues like economic development. In 
addition, media are not focused on using environmentalists as commentators, 
possibly because they do not take them seriously. A result is thus that a fruitful and 
broad public debate about environmental issues is not stimulated (Guła and Cyglicki 
interview). 
All these trends can be seen as part of a phenomenon that Poland has to live with as a 
post-communist consumer society with a strong demand for economic development. 
A common understanding of environmentalism is often as a value-driven social 
movement that started at the end of the 1960s with a post-war generation of students 
in Western Europe and North America realising that the industrial societies, 
materialist lifestyles and nuclear bombs inherited from their parents, were serious 
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threats to the sustainability of “Mother Earth”. The movement was able to grow 
strong in the west because freedom of speech allowed the discussions to take place 
and environmental catastrophes to be revealed.25 It was strengthened by the pervasive 
and exciting hippie culture, itself a result of technological and economic development 
and a growing middle class. The culture also spread to Poland as post-war 
industrialisation began to take its toll on the environment there as well, but the 
authoritarian regime did not allow for real ecological awareness or debates to take 
hold. Adding to this the needle never tipped in favour of environmentalism rather 
than economic growth during communism, since Poland did not — and has not yet 
— attained the western level of development, with a large middle class and post-
industrial economy. This means that although Poles during communism and 
afterwards have worried about the effect of daily pollution or ecological disasters 
such as the 1986 Chernobyl incident in neighbouring Ukraine, there has never been a 
broad base for a real discussion about environmental activism in Poland (Szacki et al. 
1993).  
Secondly, it is hard for environmentalism which is often defined as a leftwing 
ideology in a western sense, to find its place and be taken seriously in a political 
landscape where the left is still very much identified with communism. In several of 
my interviews Polish environmentalists mentioned that it is sometimes difficult to be 
met with respect and be taken seriously, as one is the victim of a stereotype of the 
ecological movement as being a group of tree hugging nature lovers who care more 
about animals than people. Although this “humorous” stereotype is often found in 
Western Europe too, the danger is that Polish conservatism and the post-communist 
reality makes for more severe consequences (Guła and Cyglicki interview).  
A worse label given to the ENGO movement was that of this movement being 
corrupt, after an undercover reporter from TVN showed how an NGO promoting 
 
25 Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring has been important for the founding of environmental movement.  Released in 1962 
it made people aware of how a pesticide, namely DDT, used to destroy one organism, is taken up into the food chain for 
other organism, including humans.  
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sustainable city planning was prepared to take bribes from private contractors in 
order to drop its complaints about the Golden Terraces project (Złote Tarasy), that 
could delay the construction of a new mall and office complex in downtown Warsaw 
(Gazeta Wyborcza 2005). 
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4. Method of Analysis 
4.1 The case study approach 
The study of how democratic consolidation affects ENGO participation in the 
programming of EU Funds is  best addressed through a case qualitative case study 
approach, as I am trying to answer explanatory “how” and “why” questions that deal 
with the vibrancy or weakness of the interactions between the arenas of democratic 
consolidation traced over time. ENGO participation is a long-term procedure of ever-
changing perceptions and conduct that is neither linear nor quantifiable, and although 
some statistics appear in my study, I am more historian than quantitative social 
scientist in the sense that I am solely using these figures to contextualise historical 
and political aspects of democratic consolidation in Poland. My case study approach 
differs from a historian’s by being contemporary rather than historical, and I can 
therefore include direct observation and systematic interviewing to the historian’s 
traditional scrutiny of source material. Experiments also asks “how” and “why” 
questions, but unlike case studies, the investigator must have direct and precise 
control over the behavioural events during an experiment, in order to isolate and 
thereby understand the different results. The main resemblance of a case study to an 
experiment is what Yin calls making “analytical generalisations”, where one like a 
physicist testing the theory of gravity can use developed (democratisation) theory to 
systematise and compare the results of the case study, and thereby make certain 
generalisations (Mendelson & Glenn 2002; Yin 1994).  
Flyvbjerg uses this argumentation to the fullest when fighting back against the 
conventional wisdom that case studies are less scientific than other methods since one 
cannot make generalisations on the basis of a single case. Human learning and 
knowledge can be perceived as “cases” in their own right having created a theory in 
the head of the scientist that can be tested through one final case study. Flyvbjerg 
uses Galileo’s simple rejection of Aristotle’s view of weight as a determinant for 
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gravity as an example. He reasons that Galileo must have found the Aristotelian idea 
of two objects falling faster if stuck together rather than falling individually counter-
intuitive to his understanding of gravity, and by choosing the extremes of metal and 
feather he was able to prove his point in one single case study. The main part of 
Galileo’s famous exercise is an intellectual one and the actual mythical testing of his 
theory from the Leaning Tower is beside the point and goes to show that a “good 
idea” can be worth as much as extensive multiple-case testing. This simple example 
shows that the case study with its complete, in-depth approach can be ideal for 
falsification, a rigorous scientific test that scraps the whole proposition, or what has 
been common knowledge for millennia, just one observation opposes it (Flyvbjerg 
2004). The hypotheses posed in chapter 1.7 take this logic of falsification into 
account, as they define this research as a study to reject the H0 hypothesis stating that 
there is no link between the lack of democratic consolidation and ENGO participation 
in EU Funds, rather than confirming the Hα hypothesis, that there is such a 
connection.   
4.2 Validity and reliability 
The possibility of making generalisations as discussed above is known as the external 
validity of the study. Internal validity, on the other hand, is the consistency between 
what one wants to discover and what one is actually studying, in other words the 
causal relationship (Ringdal 2001). A central question for my thesis regarding 
internal validity is the role of ENGOs in civil society. Civil society is a popular 
concept in contemporary democratisation theory, giving me reason for wanting it to 
play a central role in my thesis. The environmental sector is only a small part of the 
entire civil society in Poland, and the professional ENGOs that actively take part in 
EU funding are better organised than the average Polish CSO (Śmigrowska 
interview). I can therefore not make generalisations about how all groups in civil 
society will experience participation in EU-funds on the basis of studying ENGOs, 
which is not what I am trying to do anyway. Because they are professional and well-
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organised, certain ENGOs are actively taking part in EU financing and trying to 
represent the interests of many groups in the Polish civil society at the same time. 
They are spearheading exponents of civil society that are helping create the pattern of 
post-communist interaction between the government and this society without 
necessarily being its average representatives, and I therefore regard the internal 
validity of my case study as sufficient. 
This study has potential for external validity as well, identifying general problems of 
democratic consolidation between different societal arenas in a state, as many of the 
institutional circumstances for the interactions I am studying in Poland are common 
many places, also where there has never been communism. This does not in any way 
free me from making critical assessments of my own material as I go along. On the 
contrary, the broadness of the concept of democratic consolidation is in itself an 
incentive for a precise and tidy analysis.  
Questions concerning the reliability of a study ask whether you can easily repeat the 
study and expect the same answers over again. Human behaviour is unfortunately less 
reliable than forces of gravity, and whereas the speed of the stone or feather dropped 
from an Italian medieval tower can be calculated, the answers given by my 
interviewees are less consistent and prone to different interpretation, which makes 
listening and conversing all the more important in such a qualitative case study. Poles 
and Norwegians are culturally dissimilar and institutions in our democracies are set 
up differently. Nor do all Poles share a single understanding of what civil society and 
democratic consolidation is. The reliability of the study is then on the one hand a 
phenomenological question of how differently my interviewees and I perceive reality 
and the studied phenomenon. On the other hand it is a question of how well I do my 
job as a neutral interviewer, and how exact and honest my interviewees are (Thagaard 
1998).  I try to overcome these challenges by being well prepared in advance and by 
always following up unclear answers. Since I record my interviews, I am able to 
conduct them more like “guided conversations” making it possible to go in depth on 
different issues and ask for explanations when needed (Rubin & Rubin 1995). It is 
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more difficult to counter an interviewee’s political agenda in the interview situation, 
so this must be taken into consideration in advance, when planning the interview, and 
later when analysing the data. Not a great problem here, but naturally enough ENGOs 
will have different perceptions about their participation in EU Fund programming 
than the bureaucrats in the government, and will want to make me aware of this. 
4.3 Sources of information 
The interviews I conducted in Poland in the beginning of 2006 are my main sources 
of data. 10 of the in all 12 interviews conducted in Warsaw between 17 January and 
23 February were recorded and notes were later taken from these, allowing for easy 
access to quotes and further analysis of the interviews. The interviews were 
conducted as informal, but structured conversations using an open interview guide. 
On two different occasions I met with two people at the same time, bringing the total 
number of interviewees up to 14, in addition to email correspondence (see appendix). 
The ENGOs were the easiest to reach, as they had posted clear information on the 
internet concerning ”who’s who” in EU Fund programming and were inviting when I 
contacted them for a meeting. Eight of my interviewees were connected to EU 
funding as social partners, most of these from ENGOs. Two of my informants were 
representing economic partners, while the last four represented Ministries and the 
National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFEP&WM). 
In addition to the interviews, I found on the internet or was given, reports and 
minutes of meetings describing the participation of ENGOs in EU Fund programming 
in Poland. 
4.4 A national or regional focus? 
My admittedly limited working knowledge of the Polish language has none the less 
been important for the case selection as I realised that studying EU funding, and the 
dialogue with civil society at a national level is language wise much easier than at 
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regional voivodship level.26 At lower administrative levels one is bound to have more 
problems with interviewees who do not speak English, while politically appointees, 
civil servants, and social and economic partners working with these issues at a 
national level use English frequently for communicating with contacts abroad. It is 
also easier to find documents and reports in English at a national level, as these have 
been produced for monitoring agents in Brussels or foreign partners, and are easily 
available on the internet. The slightest caution is in order when reading such English 
language reports, e.g. produced by ENGOs, as they can represent simplified versions 
of the truth, furtively presenting politicised arguments to foreigners about the 
situation in Poland.   
Studying ENGO participation at a regional level can give more exciting results as the 
feedback from environmentalists involved in programming EU Funds at this level is 
of a somewhat more pessimistic character concerning democratic consolidation, than 
at the more “professional” national level (Śmigrowska 2004). My study is therefore 
one of “best practice” rather than corruption and undemocratic behaviour.  
 
 
 
26 Poland is divivded into 16 administrative regions known as voivodships, these comprise powiats and gminas (counties 
and communes).  
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5. EU Funds in Poland 
5.1 The Cohesion Fund as EU structural policy  
5.1.1 Setting up camp 
Apart from free access to the common European market, a major incentive for EU 
membership is the internal structural policy, meant to strengthen the economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. This cohesion is one of the 
main goals of the whole European project, stated in the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, last amended in Nice in 2003, and is a strong incentive for 
poorer European countries to democratise and modernise their states enough as to 
begin accession talks with Brussels and fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
membership. The financial aid that is promised to begin flowing with EU 
membership has also been a strong encouragement for democratic transition and 
consolidation in the EU-8 countries since 1989, and the post-accession 
implementation of Cohesion and Structural Funds in Poland in a democratic 
consolidation perspective is an interesting study as it is the place where the donkey at 
last gets its reward, the big juicy carrot. 
Though there are various pre-accession financing schemes,27 the possibilities and 
sums of money increase with EU accession. Fully fledged Member States can harvest 
everything from farming subsidies within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to 
funding for new bridges or even human resource projects from the Cohesion Fund 
(CF) and Structural Funds (SFs).28 These funds are complementary tools for aiding 
 
27 There are three main pre-accession funds. PHARE is meant to directly aid the implementation of the Acquis by creating 
new institutions and good practices for these. SAPPARD is a pre-accession Structural Fund with as special focus on rural 
and agricultural development, while ISPA is similar to the Cohesion Fund, focusing only on infrastructural projects for 
environment and transport (NDP 2003). 
28 What is often referred to as the Structural Funds in this EU budget period until the end of 2006 consists of four different 
funds with their different spheres of intervention: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund 
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economic and social cohesion in the EU but set up in a slightly different fashion. CF 
financing is obtainable only for poorer Member States with a per capita gross national 
product (GNP) at less than 90 % of the EU average, and is implemented for 
individual projects from a national level. SFs on the other hand are found in all 
Member States, have a more regional structure, and are mainly implemented through 
nationally defined SOPs in addition to European Commission administered initiatives 
like Interreg and Equal.   
CF assistance cannot exceed 85 % of the total expenditure, and all the projects 
supported by this fund must coincide with EU environmental and transport policy. 
All of the ten new Member States are eligible for CF financing, in addition to Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. As the largest new member, Poland is entitled to the most 
funding after Spain, and will receive € 4.2 billion from the EU for CF projects 
planned in the 2004–2006 period. Some national and private funding will be added to 
this CF aid, which will be spent solely on large infrastructural projects costing more 
than € 10 million. Approximately half the money will be spent on environmental 
projects within the fields of sewage management and water supply, waste 
management and improving air quality. The other half is to be spent on transport 
infrastructure, improving Polish road and rail facilities within the Trans-European 
Transport Network (TEN-T) (European Commission 2004a; NDP 2003). 
Based on a European Commission proposal for EU Funds in the new budget period 
for 2007–2013, the cohesion policy will change from a project-based support to a 
programme-based support. This means attaching the CF to the SFs, which are already 
programme-based, and thus giving the Member States more power over the whole 
funding process, as a Commission approval will only be required for major projects 
over € 25 million for environmental and € 50 million for transport projects. Today all 
CF projects are sent to Brussels for final time-consuming approval. The new system 
(ESF), Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) and European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) (NDP 2003).
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aims to increase efficiency in terms of planning, implementation and monitoring of 
funds, without it affecting transparency or quality of the cohesion policy (NDP 2003). 
The projects that are prepared for CF and SF financing in the beneficiary countries 
must be related to the needs drawn up in the programming documents for the 
allocation of the funding. The NDP is the main programming document, and is both a 
description of the economic and social situation in the country and a strategy for 
achieving the necessary development. The plan should be elaborated in compliance 
with guidelines from the European Commission and must be approved by the same 
executive body. The Polish NDP for 2004–2006 has created the main framework for 
planning, implementing and monitoring CF and SFs until the next budget period in 
2007. For SFs, the NDP has formed the basis for a Community Support Framework 
(CSF) for Poland, with € 8.3 billion of EU funding to be implemented together with 
government- and private money in drawn up SOPs for economic and societal 
modernisation, infrastructure and regional development (European Commission 
2004a). 
5.1.2 The management and control system for the Cohesion Fund  
Changes are currently being made to how EU Funds will be implemented in the 
2007–2013 budget period, but below I mainly relate to the old system that has been in 
place for 2004–2006, since it is the project selection process in this period that I am 
studying.  One must however bear in mind that the Polish Ministry of Regional 
Development was created after the Parliamentary elections in 2005. One of the main 
tasks of this ministry will be to coordinate all the different financing schemes and 
make the EU Funds less complicated and bureaucratic. The programming documents 
are being amended in order to fit this new organisation, with consultations taking 
place in 2006, so it is still not entirely clear which ministries and departments will do 
what in the future, or how the management and control systems for these funds will 
operate. 
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According to the Council regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 that 
established the CF, the Member States must set up an effective management and 
control system for these finances. Other Council and Commission legislation on how 
to set up and manage the Fund have later followed suit and these have been adopted 
by a series of Polish legal acts and programming documents. One of the main 
documents, of utmost importance for the 2004–2006 period, is the Polish NDP Act of 
20 April 2004. The result is the management structure presented in the diagram 
below (Ministry of Economy and Labour 2004). 
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Figure 5.1 The Cohesion Fund’s management and control system 
for 2004–2006 in Poland (Ministry of Economy and Labour 
2004:14). 
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The Paying Authority is a separate department in the Ministry of Finance, supervised 
by the Under Secretary of State. The task of this department involves the handling 
and monitoring of all the financial transfers, payments and accounts that are needed 
for cohesion funding (ibid.).  
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According to the programming documents the role of Managing Authority for the 
2004–2006 period should be carried out by the Department for Coordination of the 
Cohesion Fund in the Ministry of Economy and Labour. The Ministry’s Under 
Secretary of State supervises the Managing Authority, which is responsible for all 
official contact with the European Commission regarding the CF, such as handing 
over the formal applications and informing Brussels about the organisation of the CF 
system in Poland. The department is also responsible for drafting the Manual of 
Cohesion Fund Management and Control, ensuring widespread information about the 
fund and appointing the Monitoring committee (ibid.).  
Intermediate bodies 
It is within the intermediate bodies that the practical work of selecting and developing 
projects is done. The two intermediate bodies, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
and the Ministry of Transport and Construction (MoTC) have departments working 
with the CF, supervising local bids and tenders, giving opinions to the implementing 
bodies, setting up SCs and having contact with the Managing and Paying Authorities. 
For environmental projects the CF structure has intermediate bodies at several levels 
with the Voivodship Funds for Environmental Protection and Water Management 
(VFEP&WM) being important for regional knowledge and contact with the public, 
and the NFEP&WM coordinating the work between these Voivodship Funds (ibid.).  
Implementing bodies 
The implementing bodies are usually also the final beneficiaries, be it the Polish State 
Railways (PKP), the General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways 
(GDDKiA), local authorities, communal associations or municipal companies. The 
project ideas and preliminary applications start here, and this is the level with the 
most local knowledge. These bodies are responsible for designing feasible projects in 
line with rules and regulations, preparing and issuing tenders, consulting the public, 
carrying out investments and paying the contractors (ibid.).      
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5.1.3 The project selection process 
Coordinating the selection of environmental CF projects in 2004–2006 has been the 
responsibility of the Department of European Integration in the MoE. Transport 
projects are coordinated in the MoTC by the Department of Investment and 
Economic Analysis with help from the Department of Programming and Strategy. 
Selecting environmental projects 
After all the relevant laws and EU regulations are in place, the project application and 
selection can commence. The potential beneficiaries submit their project proposals to 
the appropriate regional VFEP&WM. This body is also responsible for informing 
partners in the Voivodships about the Cohesion Fund, and supplying them with all 
the necessary forms and documents. The 16 VFEP&WM assess the proposals with 
regards to formality and substantiality. Applications that do not meet formal 
requirements are returned to applicants for corrections. The VFEP&WM then prepare 
lists of all the potential projects in their regions and these lists are sent to the 
Voivodship Marshals for comments and verification that the projects are not also 
being submitted for SF funding. Having received the opinions from the Marshals, the 
lists are then sent to the NFEP&WM where substantial environmental, financial and 
technical assessments of the proposed projects are made on the basis of criteria set 
out in the Framework Reference Document for Cohesion Fund Assistance. The 
National Fund also prepares a joint list of all the projects that have been received, 
which is sent to the MoE for a final project selection on the basis of the discussion in 
the steering committee (ibid.). 
The steering committee is set up by the Minister of Environment in accordance with 
the Polish NDP Act, and should include representatives from the Managing 
Authority, the Intermediate Bodies, Voivodship authorities and social and economic 
partners, including ENGOs. In the committee the projects are then discussed and a 
list of projects recommended for further preparation is submitted to the Minister of 
Environment for approval. The approved projects are then sent back down through 
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the system for the final preparation of the application for CF assistance and all the 
other preparations that are involved before the projects can commence. Feasibility 
studies and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are important analyses that 
are performed at this preliminary stage. Complete applications are sent to the 
Managing Authority in the Ministry of Economy and Labour, and on to the European 
Commission (ibid.). 
Selecting transport projects 
For transport projects the process is simpler since the Framework Reference 
Document for Cohesion Fund Assistance makes it clear that the nature and scale of 
the projects are such that only two beneficiaries are needed, PKP and GDDKiA. 
These bodies give their recommendations to the MoTC where the preliminary list of 
prioritised projects is drafted after formal, financial, and technical assessments have 
been made by the relevant departments in the Ministry. A working group of 
bureaucrats and external experts make a final assessment, which is passed on to the 
steering committee for discussion and recommendation of projects for which to 
prepare CF applications. The necessary consent is given by the Minister of Transport 
and Construction, before a project is sent to the Managing Authority and on to 
Brussels for final approval (ibid.).  
The steering committee for transport is appointed by the Minister of Transport and 
Construction in accordance with article 23 in the NDP Act of 2004, and consists of 
representatives from the Managing Authority, the MoTC, regional and local 
authorities, and social and economic partners, including one ENGO. By invitation of 
the President of the committee, representatives from the implementing bodies and 
other institutions may take part in the committee sessions. The committee will 
suggest the sequence of preparation and submission of projects to the European 
Commission, and is free to ask the implementing bodies for explanations and 
justifications, or even appoint an additional expert assessment if this should be 
necessary (ibid.).  
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5.2 Civil society and Cohesion Fund programming 
Civil society has an ambivalent role in CF programming as is the case for SFs. On the 
one hand public participation is recognised by the European Commission and the 
Members States as important for the programming, implementation and monitoring 
of the Funds, promoting transparency and projects of high quality that are in the best 
interest of all affected parts of society, rather than rushed, unsustainable projects that 
may be regretted at a later stage. On the other hand, the fear of obstruction and delay 
seems to have led to a pragmatic stance of not voicing the need for public 
participation in a too loud a way, neither in Brussels nor in the Member States. For 
the EU Funds this slightly schizophrenic scenario has created rules of play that are 
general and vague and frequently changing. There is a lack of information about the 
correct procedures regarding public participation, which often in any case allow for 
broad interpretation. The role that civil society ends up playing is therefore often a 
somewhat random result of the individuals and bureaucratic cultures involved in EU 
Funds at a local, regional and national level (Guła et al. 2004; Stoczkiewicz 2004). 
5.2.1 The Partnership Principle 
A changing paradigm? 
The partnership principle is one of these vague concepts that can be interpreted 
broadly. It is implemented in two ways, vertical partnership between the European 
Commission and the Member State, and a more horizontal partnership between the 
Member State and the institutions and organisations within Linz and Stepan’s 5 
arenas. The Council regulation setting up the Structural Funds makes it clear that it is 
the responsibility of the Member State to designate the most representative 
partnership at all levels; national, regional and local, and that the partnership shall 
cover preparation, financing, monitoring and evaluation. The partnership should take 
place within the framework of national rules and current practices and involve public 
authorities, economic and social partners and: “any other relevant competent bodies 
within this framework” (Council of the EU 1999). In the proposal for new Council 
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regulation laying down the provisions for EU Funds in the 2007–2013 period, the 
European Commission suggests that the last part be substituted by: “any other 
appropriate body representing civil society, environmental partners, non-
governmental organisations, and bodies responsible for promoting equality between 
men and women” (European Commission 2004c:article 10). This change of wording 
has not been taken into consideration in the Council’s compromise text of 21 
December 2005, and although the Council has until 31 October 2006 to review the 
Commission’s proposal, it does not seem likely that civil society will be given special 
attention in the final Council regulation. This upsets many CSOs since they would 
like to see firm, concrete legislation from the EU regarding partnership (Friends of 
the Earth 2006). 
Partnership is a popular idea in Brussels, on paper at least, and is also mentioned as a 
core principle for management of EU funds. A reason for this focus on partnership is 
that the EU has signed and ratified the Aarhus Convention,29 forcing public 
authorities to enhance the information and public participation in environmental 
matters. Article 1 of the Convention states that: 
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of 
present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his 
or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of 
access to information, public participation in decision-making, and 
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention (UNECE 1998). 
This UN Convention is closely related to principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, that environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. Moreover it focuses on 
interactions between the civil society and the public authorities regarding 
environmental questions, by claiming that it is a human right to have a say in how 
one’s local environment is affected by policy implementation. The Aarhus 
 
29 The full name is the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters. The convention, set up by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe was signed in 
Aarhus on 25 June 1998 (UNECE 1998). 
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Convention is therefore not only an environmental agreement, but also deals more 
generally with government accountability, transparency and responsiveness (UNECE 
1998).  
Another important reason for focusing on partnership is that it is a cheap way of 
ensuring high-quality policy implementation of for example EU Funds. Social and 
economic partners stimulate project ideas, provide important scientific and regional 
information and help identify solutions for the best implementation, while monitoring 
the whole process. Decentralisation down to, and within the Member States can be a 
way of improving the funding efficiency, and from 2007 more national verification of 
Cohesion Fund projects will take place. Where the EU apparatus loses control with 
decentralisation, social and economic partners can step in as consultants and 
watchdogs. On the other hand, too much partnership can easily become time 
consuming and inefficient. These two conflicting views create a somewhat vague EU 
position on horizontal partnership in the new programming documents for EU Funds, 
leaving this up to the Member States to consider and implement (European 
Commission 2004b; Stoczkiewicz 2004: 56).   
Polish partnership 
The Polish NDP Act of 20 April 2004 clearly ensures that the implementation of EU 
Funds must take place through partnership with social and economic partners that 
are: 
Organisations of entrepreneurs and employers, trade unions, 
professional self-government, NGOs and academic units, whose 
activity is related to the issues covered by the NDP and by the 
Operational Programmes or the Reference Framework for the Cohesion 
Fund (cited in Stoczkiewicz 2004).  
Further, the Act on Public Benefit Activity and Voluntary Assistance defines NGOs 
as: 
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Corporate and non-corporate entities not forming part of the public 
finance sector as described in the Public Finances Act, not operating for 
profit, and formed on the basis of relevant legislative provisions, 
including foundations and associations (cited in Stoczkiewicz 2004). 
Although these legal definitions are clear enough, they give a rather broad 
understanding of partnership, meaning that virtually anyone could qualify for such a 
status, and thus endanger “real” civil society’s chance of influencing EU Funds. This 
can cause neutrality problems, as exemplified by voluntary fire brigades that are 
legally defined as NGOs, and want to take part in programming EU funding. These 
brigades share long and popular traditions in parts of Poland, but they are clearly 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOS) who perform 
services for local authorities and are therefore not fully independent third sector 
actors (Guła and Cyglicki interview).  
In general, Poland can be seen as successfully catching up with older Member States 
and even overtaking some of them. Public participation in environmental assessments 
has been ranked as better off in Poland than in Spain, Portugal and Greece 
(Bolshakova et al. 1998),30 and the fact that the Polish NDP Act from 2004 
introduced steering committees that were not strictly required, nor the norm in many 
western Member States, shows that public participation all in all is quite strong for 
environmental policy in Poland. This may change with the new NDP Act expected to 
be less embracive of civil society. 
5.2.2 Steering Committees  
A broad definition of partnership was included in the 2004 NDP Act, allowing for the 
creation of consultancy bodies known as steering committees for both Cohesion and 
Structural Funds. Partnership was not strictly necessary for the implementation of the 
CF in 2004–2006, as it wasn’t mentioned in the specific regulations for this fund.31 It 
 
30 Namely the public partaking in EIA and SEA assessment (Bolshakova et al. 1998).  
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/1994 (Stoczkiewicz 2004).  
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will be from 2007 though, since the same basic regulations for the SFs will also be 
adopted by the CF. The irony is that it has been suggested to drop steering 
committees altogether from 2007, and focus on partnership in mainly monitoring 
committees, assessing the implementation of the EU Funds, rather than the 
programming of them. The two “voluntary” steering committees for the CF in 2004–
2006 are therefore interesting, but possibly “dying” cases. In addition, these 
committees have already finished their work as all the funding is already assigned, 
and projects sent to the Commission for approval (Stoczkiewicz 2004).                                                
The steering committee for the environment 
Since 17 July 2003 steering committee meetings were held by the MoE, in order to 
assess and accept projects that should be sent to the European Commission for CF 
financing. Originally 12 members, the committee was extended to 18 members with 
the NDP Act in 2004 stating that regional and local government, and the social and 
economic partners must each have a third of the members. In the 18 member-strong 
committee, 6 members were from the MoE, the Ministry of Economy and Labour and 
NFEP&WM, another 6 represented self-government at regional and local level, while 
the rest were social and economic partners. Of these 6 it was decided that one third 
should be ENGO representatives. Initially, the MoE planned to pick environmental 
partners for this committee itself, as was the case for the other steering committee 
members. The ENGOs strongly wanted to democratically select their own 
representatives and an arrangement was made so that environmental activists would 
run for election on the Ministry’s website, and the ENGOs would vote for their 
favourite candidates. There were some initial discussions about who should be able to 
put forward their candidature and vote, since many voluntary fire brigades have 
environmentalism in their statutes but do not have a real ENGO mandate. In the end 
Andrzej Guła from the Institute of Environmental Economics in Kraków and Andrzej 
Kassenberg from the Institute for Sustainable Development in Warsaw were chosen.  
The other four social and economic partners, from trade unions and labour 
organisations, were picked by the MoE after an invitation to submit candidates.  A 
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representative from each was picked from the rightwing Solidarity trade union and 
the left-wing and SLD-friendly All-Polish Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ). The last 
two partners were from the Confederation of Polish Employers and the The 
Association of Polish Foresters.  
The steering committee would meet 4 times pr. year as a minimum and the MoE 
would call for extra meetings when projects needed approving. Of the 143 projects 
discussed by the committee, 85 were recommended for funding from the CF. 66 of 
these projects concerned water and wastewater while 16 dealt with waste 
management and rehabilitation. The last three projects were for air and flood 
protection. With the sending of these 85 projects to the European Commission, the 
MoE has spent all the cohesion funding made available for environmental issues in 
the 2004–2006 period (Książek email; Malarz and Czeczko interview).  
Decisions were made in this committee by majority voting, but ideally it tried to 
reach consensus. Andrzej Kassenberg has suggested a system of “one time 
constructive veto” instead of majority voting, where one can block a proposal once 
by having a constructive alternative. If this fails the proposal is voted upon as normal. 
This system would strengthen the environmental minority cause in the committee, but 
would take more time, and has not been tested out in this committee (Kassenberg 
interview). 
The information about the different projects was usually sent to the committee 
members a week before the meeting, which the ENGO representatives generally felt 
was early enough, but from time to time the project information was sent too late. It 
was even experienced that the information wasn’t sent at all, but rather found lying 
on the table at the start of the meeting (ibid.). Although project information improved 
in the course of the funding process, the quality of this information was never 
supreme. It was often seen by ENGOs as imprecise, erroneous and contradictory, 
bearing witness to a somewhat rushed process. It seemed that the MoE and 
NFEP&WM were both overworked and afraid of the selection process coming to a 
halt, and were therefore not prepared to spend much time discussing the projects or 
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the faults of them. The pressure of quick allocation of funds, without clear selection 
criteria or information on how EIAs had been conducted was the single most 
frustrating experience the social partners had from the committee work. There just 
did not seem to be enough time for a proper discussion on how allocation best could 
meet the requirements set out in EU environmental legislation (Guła and Cyglicki 
interview; Kassenberg interview).  
Apart from this frustration with the whole system of committees, being “voting 
machines” rather than arenas for finding constructive solutions, the ENGOs were 
positive about taking part in this committee. Main reasons for this are that they were 
allowed to select their own representatives through voting and that they generally 
find their contributions are increasingly being valued and listened to by a MoE that is 
steadily improving its organisational role (ibid.). 
The steering committee for transport 
The steering committee for transport was also initially set up with two democratically 
elected ENGO representatives of a total of 10 committee members. Robert Cyglicki 
from the Polish Green Network and Zbigniew Karaczun from the Polish Ecological 
Club were elected by the environmental groups after it was agreed that the successful 
ENGO-voting scheme from the MoE committee should be adopted by this steering 
committee. The committee was disbanded in June 2004 with the implementation of 
the NDP Act. The Act changed the composition of the steering committee stating that 
a third of the committee members must represent regional and local government and 
another third represent social and economic partners. A new committee was formed 
in August the same year, but this time the election procedure was ignored and Robert 
Cyglicki was picked as the only ENGO representative of 9 committee members in 
total, 3 of whom were social and economic partners. The additional partners were 
also selected by the MoTC, after proposing their candidatures. The other social and 
economic partners represented the transport section of the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce and the Railway Scientific and Technical Centre. The other 6 members 
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represented the MoTC, the Managing Authority32 and different levels of self-
government (Guła et al. 2004; Pulikowski email; Śmigrowska 2004). 
As in the steering committee for environment, there was majority voting and all 
representatives had one vote each. Voting would mainly take place for selecting 
projects for proposed CF financing, but would occasionally also cover voting over 
committee regulations would take place too. Since 2003 7 meetings were held in all 
and 15 projects sent to Brussels for CF funding, 9 road projects, 5 rail projects and 1 
technical assistance (TA) project for the MoTC. Apart from voting, the social and 
economic partners were seen by the MoTC as helpful consultants regarding technical 
issues and EIA procedures (Pulikowski email).  
Cyglicki’s experience as a social partner in this committee seemed to be less 
affirmative than Guła and Kassenberg’s experience in the steering committee for the 
environment. Cyglicki was the only environmentalist in his committee and felt that 
the partnership was largely “pro-forma”, merely as required by the NDP. It was felt 
that little environmental interest was taken here, except regarding technical issues like 
EIAs. Naturally, the MoTC and other committee members dealing with transport 
infrastructure can not be expected to be as interested in environmental issues as the 
members of a steering committee set up for improving the environment. A main 
problem seemed to be the amount of old-fashioned “communist concrete” working 
with rail and road issues in Poland, especially amongst the beneficiaries in PKP and 
the GDDKiA. Road and rail projects take a long time to plan, and these beneficiaries 
are typically interested in using EU funding for financing projects that have already 
been planned, without a clear understanding of, or interest in environmental 
consequences. The ENGOs realise that roads must be built in Poland, but want to 
make sure they are built in a way that is best for the environment, in accordance with 
EU environmental regulations (Guła and Cyglicki interview). 
 
32 Ministry of Economy and Labour. 
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5.2.3 Public consultations 
Another way of fulfilling the partnership principle and the Aarhus Convention is by 
making sure the process of consultations with the public is optimal. Consultations 
should take place for both the setting up of main programming documents like the 
NDP, and for the individual projects for which EU funding is proposed. 
National Development Plan consultation 
NDPs are set up in EU Member States in order to present a long term and common 
focus on all the major developmental issues that the country faces, and a suggestion 
of how EU structural policy can aid this development. In Poland preparation of the 
NDP for 2004–2006 was begun in 2000 by an inter-ministerial working group with 
help from academics and other experts in the fields relevant to the NDP. The drafting 
was done, from the end of 2000, in dialogue with the European Commission. 
Between July and November 2002 the draft NDP was consulted at conferences, 
seminars and meetings all across Poland in accordance with the Partnership Principle, 
and ENGOs were also able to take part. In the same period, “ex-ante evaluations”33 
of the draft NDP were done through a joint Polish and French project, and a Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA)34 of the same document was made by the Regional 
Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, financed by the Italian and 
Norwegian governments. Polish ENGO participation in this SEA was the main and 
most constructive way for this sector to take part in the programming of the NDP as 
comments from the SEA were mentioned in the final NDP. The SEA criticised the 
NDP for not having clear enough measures for environmental protection, and 
proposed amongst other things 23 environmental “mega-criteria” that should be 
 
33 Ex-ante evaluation refers to forward-looking assessment of the likely future social, economic and environmental effects 
of new policies of proposals, and must be conducted in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 and the 
Polish NDP Act of 20 April 2004 (NDP 2003:161). 
34 The purpose of SEAs is to ensure that environmental consequences of plans and programmes are identified and assessed 
during their preparation and before their adoption, like the EIAs done for individual projects. The public and environmental 
authorities can give their opinions that should be taken into account in the creation of programming documents like the 
NDP (The Council of the EU 2001).  
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implemented for the “greening” of the NDP. The final version of the Polish NDP for 
2004–2006 was adopted by the Polish Cabinet on 14 January 2003 and meant that the 
detailed planning of implementing EU Funds could commence (NDP 2003). 
The process was similar for the 2007–2013 budget period. The Preliminary Draft 
NDP for 2007–2013 was passed by the Polish government on 11 January 2005 based 
on expert opinions on the development of Poland, inter-ministerial discussions and 
consultations with the European Commission. The draft was then offered for ex-ante 
evaluation and broad nationwide consultation until the end of May 2005, and over 
130 conferences and many more meetings were held across Poland. The 
environmental sector in Poland held a two-day consultation workshop in Warsaw in 
March 2005, with over 50 ENGO representatives present to discuss the 
environmental implications of the NDP for 2007–2013. The result was a 70 page 
document that was presented to all ministries and regional authorities, but nothing 
much came out of it as none of their suggestions were taken into consideration in 
further NDP programming. The ENGOs therefore see this whole consultation 
process, and their own barely ad-hoc role, as a way of satisfying formal requirements, 
rather than instigating real partnership with civil society. This makes the ENGOs 
disillusioned and disappointed (Dworakowska 2005; Smigrowska Interview).  
One of these disappointments concerns the lack of clarity at both national and 
European level regarding SEAs and ex-ante evaluations of how proposed plans and 
programmes will affect the environment in the next budget period. Thorough 
assessments were made for the 2004–2006 NDP with foreign help from France, Italy 
and Norway, but whereas the government claims all is well for the 2007–2013 
evaluations, ENGOs remain unconvinced. They trust neither the “independence” of 
the evaluation group set up by the government, nor that the results of rushed 
evaluations and SEAs will take environmentalism into thorough consideration. 
ENGOs see the 2007–2013 NDP as delegating the environmental responsibility down 
to the level of the individual SOP as a part of the decentralisation trend for EU fund 
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management, and are worried that this will hinder the EU Funds from having a green 
profile. 
The new PiS government, set up in the autumn of 2005 and broadened in May 2006, 
is trying to impose smoother, more efficient implementation of EU funds. The 
National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) for 2007–2013 has therefore been 
drafted and was consulted during the spring of 2006. This document aims at 
amending the draft 2007–2013 NDP, and corresponds to a new legal act that is to 
replace the 2004 NDP Act. One of the suggestions is to replace the 11 SOPs planned 
in the NDP with six new programmes, since experience from SFs in 2004–2006 has 
shown that the individual SOPs have not reached their goals regarding the amount of 
financing they had planned to implement in this period. The simple idea is that it will 
be easier to implement a few, broad SOPs that are all coordinated by the same well-
oiled machine, the newfound Ministry of Regional Development. The planned SOP 
for environment will in this case be closed down and its projects transferred to the 
SOP for Infrastructure. ENGOs worry that funding made available for environmental 
projects can instead be spent on road building, as it is possible to redefine spending 
within the individual SOPs (CEE Bankwatch Network 2006; Pulikowski email, 
Wójcik 2005).  
Project consultation 
Measures planned improved by the draft NDP for 2007–2013 include the routines for 
public consultation of the proposed projects, and the control from the Ministries 
regarding this. For the 2004–2006 period most projects were consulted without strict 
rules, with the beneficiaries themselves being responsible for informing the 
Ministries about their consultation process. The quality of consultations in this period 
is mildly put quite unconvincing. The projects that have started can go ahead as 
planned, but for the next period things should be stricter, with the Ministries taking 
more responsibility to ensure that the public has actually been consulted thoroughly 
(Gliniecka interview; Malarz and Czeczko interview). 
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Poor quality public consultation is one of those issues that can be related to 
bureaucratic path-dependency from authoritarian times. There is no real tradition for 
such consultation in Poland, and since there are not sufficient regulations from the 
EU concerning this, superior democratic practice is not implemented overnight. 
Consultation has been treated lightly by the beneficiaries, as a way of merely 
informing the public about what’s going on, rather than creating an arena for 
feedback and constructive dialogue. My environmental interviewees have 
experienced consultations that are more like press-conferences, taking place late in 
the programming phase, just weeks before construction is supposed to start, and after 
all permissions have been given. When a beneficiary has not even assigned a person 
to take down the minutes of the meetings in order register the feedback, it is regarded 
by the environmentalists as more for show than a serious consultation (Guła and 
Cyglicki interview; Rytel interview). Nor is the quality of project information given 
by the beneficiaries for consultation always sufficient. An example is the building of 
a road viaduct in Warsaw’s North Praga district, where the project was presented on a 
website with a very imprecise indication of this viaduct on a large scale city map 
(Rytel interview). 
As with the issue of SEAs of the NDP and its SOPs, EIAs must be made for 
individual projects in agreement with the amended Council directive 97/11/EC. This 
assessment is supposed to ensure that environmental consequences of projects are 
identified and assessed before authorisation is given. Civil society must be aware of 
this and give its opinions before all results are taken into account in the authorisation 
procedure for the project (Council of the EU 1997). As was commented on by 
ENGOs regarding steering committee work, these EIAs are often being carelessly 
done at a very late stage. Whether the quality of project consultation or EIAs will 
improve in the new programming period is hard to say. A simplification of 
procedures can on the one hand make this consultation easier for all parties involved, 
while the decentralisation and possible worsening of the partnership principle 
regarding ENGO participation in steering committees can reduce the transparency 
surrounding the funding procedures and civil society’s influence on EU Funds.  
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5.3 Summing up 
This chapter has described the structure of the Cohesion Fund in Poland, and the role 
of ENGOs in the two steering committees that existed for this fund in 2004–2006. 
The general functioning of the partnership principle has also been discussed, 
concerning how civil society is taking part in the consultations of programming 
documents and individual projects related to EU Funds. The voluntary initiative to set 
up steering committees in the MoE and MoTC shows that the government and the 
state apparatus is willing to include different societal arenas in the planning of large 
infrastructural projects. The value of this partnership and general public consultations 
is less clear as it has been suggested to do away with steering committees in the next 
budget period. It seems that the presence of ENGOs is appreciated for their 
competence on environmental legislation and technical issues, and that this broad 
participation “looks good” from a Brussels perspective. Nevertheless the 
environmental partners feel that the interest in making green choices and giving 
priority to environmental issues at the end of the day is secondary since there are just 
too many other issues to deal with. In the next chapter I return to the theoretical 
framework and historical characteristics developed in chapters 2 and 3, and discuss to 
what degree ENGO participation can be perceived as path dependent of democratic 
consolidation.   
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6. EU Fund Programming and Democratic 
Consolidation 
6.1 Political society 
Implementing EU Funds is very much a political process at the programming level, as 
political society is naturally involved in designing the legislation and the 
programming documents in the Polish government and later debating these in the 
Sejm. In order to keep my H0 hypothesis this programming must happen in a 
democratically consolidated political society in dialogue with the other societal 
arenas, also the ENGOs in civil society. A consolidated political society is free and 
inclusive, offering open electoral competition of political alternatives for the tasks of 
managing the state apparatus, and controlling the other arenas of democratic 
consolidation. In order to be successful at this the political society needs attitudinal 
legitimacy in the eyes of the civil society as well as legal guarantees from rule of law 
that are maintained by an impartial state apparatus (Linz & Stepan 1996:14).  
6.1.1 A distrusted political society 
A main problem with democratic consolidation in this arena is the lack of attitudinal 
legitimacy it has, path dependent of Poland’s long history of oppression, the “us” and 
“them” dichotomy created between the political society and the civil society during 
communism and continued in Polish politics after 1989, affecting communists and 
anti-communists alike (Ost 2005:24–25). Poles strongly distrust politics as shown by 
the statistics presented in chapter 2.2.1 (CBOS 2004). This strong distrust affects the 
programming of EU Funds too as it hinders cooperation and dialogue between the 
political society, that manages the state apparatus and thus also the EU funds, and 
civil society close to the receiving end of these funds.  
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Most of my interviewees from civil society expressed distrust with polish politics in 
general, and more specifically the politicians involved in steering committee 
meetings for EU Funds. An example is found in the environmental steering 
committee for the Cohesion Fund where the ENGOs had great problems cooperating 
with the Under Secretary from the MoE that initially chaired the committee, neither 
accepting his leadership style nor trusting his motives behind only presenting some of 
the projects prepared by the NFEP&WM to the steering committee. This led to much 
arguing, affected the committee’s work, and finally the Secretary of State was 
brought in to chair the committee instead (Kassenberg interview; Kędzierski 
interview). The ENGOs’ dislike of a chairperson is partly related to the general 
competence and charisma of the individual who is in this position, but political 
distrust is also part of the problem as the environmentalists specifically claim that a 
chairperson’s political affiliations can be threatening to the quality of the debate and 
the voting in the steering committee. Since the voting is open, ENGOs believe that 
high level civil servants in these committees find it hard voting against and thus 
conflicting the views of nominated political officials from their ministries, as they can 
feel that their positions are in danger if they do (Guła and Cyglicki interview).   
6.1.2 Lacking green party politics 
Another result of this political distrust that affects EU Fund programming, is the 
absence of a strong green movement in party politics, both as consistent ideological 
streaks in the main political parties and as separate ecological parties. The presence of 
environmentalism in national politics would help keep a steady focus on such issues 
amongst politicians, the media and down to the voters, and would thereby also 
strengthen the environmental arguments for implementing EU Funds. The Ecological 
Forum of the liberal, centrist Freedom Union (UW)35 was an exception in the 1990s, 
and had several members in the Sejm.36 The Forum’s leader Radosław Gawlik was 
 
35 UW is now known as the Democratic Party. 
36 8 UW members of the Sejm between 1993 and 1997 were members of the Ecological Forum (Ferry & Rüdig 2002: 10).  
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also chosen as deputy Minister for the Environment when UW entered government as 
a junior coalition partner after the 1997 elections. Similar bonds were forged to the 
left of politics, with the Polish Green Party (PPZ) teaming up with the ex-communists 
from SLD (Ferry & Rüdig 2002).  
Although this shows that environmental interests have been present in national 
politics in the decade and a half since the end of communism, it can be argued that 
their influence has been rather trivial as they are a small minority in this political 
sphere, dominated by “bread and butter” concerns to increase economic growth and 
reduce unemployment. Additionally, it is bound to be hard to consolidate 
environmentalism in national politics when environmental politicians, neither manage 
to cooperate between themselves because of different party allegiances, nor have the 
backing from the largely apolitical environmental movement (ibid.). With a 5 % 
threshold for entry into the Sejm, and the right-hand turn of the new PiS government 
in the last general elections in 2005, the possibility of strengthening the 
environmental focus in Polish politics looks pretty slim.  
The ray of light is the new green party called Zieloni 2004, loosely connected to the 
milieu from the old Ecological Forum through initiative taker Radosław Gawlik. In 
the 2005 presidential elections Zieloni 2004 broadened its political base by signing an 
agreement supporting Marek Borowski, the presidential candidate from the newly 
founded Social Democratic Party of Poland (SDPL), a splinter group from SLD, for 
left-wing voters disenchanted with corruption and nepotism amongst ex-communist 
politicians. Zieloni 2004 only got 20,000 votes in the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
far below the entry threshold, but might do better in the local elections in October 
2006, since it can generally be easier to front environmental issues locally than 
nationally. Zieloni 2004 has broad support from “alternative” groups in civil society 
like ENGOs, feminists, and human rights activists, and enjoys a strong European 
network through its membership in the European Green Party (European Greens 
2006). If the party survives it might come to play a small but important role 
representing Polish civil society activism in a left-wing coalition with SLD and 
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SDPL, and again bring environmentalism onto the main stage of Polish political 
society. Until then ENGOs in civil society and environmental EU legislation will play 
the principal roles as watchdogs and enforcers of environmental policy in Poland, 
also regarding EU Funds.  
6.1.3 Politicised state apparatus 
This absence of environmentalism in party politics and civil society’s distrust of 
political society join force and affect ENGO participation in EU Fund programming 
negatively because of the politicised state apparatus. Although political leadership of 
the state apparatus is normal and even necessary, this leadership reaches too far in 
Poland and violates the impartiality of the civil service. The result is that the new 
elected governments make many changes to the set up of the Ministries and personnel 
working for them, disrupting the EU Fund programming and other important policy 
implementation taking place, as well as the dialogue between the state apparatus and 
the already suspicious civil society.  
Since the first non-communist government was elected in June 1989, there have been 
10 different governments that have not shared a common vision about how the public 
administration and civil service should be developed. With the new constitution in 
1997 and other important legislation like the Civil Service Act introduced in 1999 
things have moved along, albeit slowly. The reduction of politicisation and increase 
of professionalism in the civil service is one of the most important developments that 
the 1999 Act was supposed to aid, but it is still regarded more as an objective rather 
than a clear existing structure. Reports from the Polish Ombudsmen have been very 
critical of public administration in recent years, and a joint EU/OECD report from 
2002 assesses that even if the new legislation exists, there has not been any political 
will to resolutely implement the new system. Regarding the politicisation problem the 
report concludes that:  
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The political impartiality of the civil service is not guaranteed, and the 
mechanisms to foster integrity are neither sufficiently developed nor 
enforced. The situation seems worse in local government and districts 
where politically biased recruitment practices lead to low levels of 
professionalism and make the delivery of de-centralised public services 
problematic (EU/OECD 2002:10).  
These beliefs are also common amongst my interviewees, especially regarding the 
unprofessional practices at local government level where transparency is absent and 
the roles of, and connections between, politicians, businessmen and “social partners” 
are diffuse. The Ministry of Environment on the other hand is evaluated positively as 
being interested in dialogue with ENGOs. This is naturally enough also the ministry 
where environmentalists feel most at home and best  know who to contact to be heard 
(Guła and Cyglicki interview). 
6.1.4 Change of government — looking ahead  
Politically appointed personnel in the state apparatus working with EU Funds and 
enjoying wide autonomy to design policy without much concern for social and 
economic partnership can be a worry regarding the new right-wing government 
sworn in on the 31 October 2005. They have already amended the suggested SOPs 
and the NDP Act from 2004, and made changes to governmental offices regarding 
departmental structures and the civil servants working there.37  The creation of the 
Ministry of Regional Development is one of these changes that affect EU funding 
greatly. This new ministry will administer most of the future EU Funds in Poland, the 
new government arguing that a new, more effective institution is needed since 
Structural Fund implementation has not been optimal in the 2004–2006 period. There 
are naturally enough different opinions about this, but some suspicious social and 
economic partners see this as the new government redistributing EU Funds for 
regional development in rural, eastern areas populated by their own voters, rather 
 
37 Jerzy Kędzierski, vice-president of the NFEP&WM was the only civil servant I met who was heading for early 
retirement as a direct result of the new government. He was dismissed in January 2006, while two board members of the 
National Fund had to step down in the autumn of 2005 (Kędzierski interview).   
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than implementing the funding through the 11 SOPs, including one for the 
environment, as originally planned (Andrzejewicz interview).  
The changes within the political society after the 2005 elections have also led to 
guessing about how the dialogue between the political society and other arenas of 
democratic consolidation will change. On the one hand PiS’ strong connection to the 
Solidarity movement and the fact that their political platform is partly created on the 
retribution against the shadiness and corruption within the ex-communist SLD 
government, could hint at the PiS government trying to be transparent and tidy while 
creating a broad dialogue with civil society. Additionally it can be argued that PiS 
probably does not have as large a network of technocrats and scholars as the liberals 
and the left-wing, and that they will therefore be humble at implementing EU Funds, 
listening to experts from civil society. On the other hand the Polish right-wing 
criticism of SLD is perceived by many as mostly a political ploy to make 
disenchanted voters with low electoral volatility “swing back” to the right after 
disappointment with SLD. There is neither any ground for believing that PiS’ policy 
is more democratically inclusive, as they are economically protectionist and even 
somewhat inclined to anti-liberal governance through their cooperation with the 
League of Polish Families and especially Self Defence. 
6.2 Rule of law 
Rule of law is an important feature of a consolidated democracy as it: “establishes a 
hierarchy of norms that make actions by, and upon, other arenas legitimate and 
predictable” (Linz & Stepan 1996:14). The norms must be strongly rooted in civil 
society and be respected by all the arenas of a consolidated democracy. For EU Funds 
in Poland, these norms take the form of the Polish NDP Act from 2004, stating how 
the implementation of Cohesion and Structural Funds must take place. The NDP Act 
provides the basis for guidelines and other programming documents concerning EU 
Fund implementation as well as the legal grounds for the partnership principle 
demanded by the Council regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. Any clear indications about 
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rule of law not being followed regarding such partnership in programming EU Funds 
lets me reject the H0 hypothesis of there not being any relationship between 
democratic consolidation an ENGO participation in such funding (NDP 2003). 
6.2.1 A vague legal framework 
Just as “legal vagueness” was discussed as a general problem in chapter 2.2.2 with a 
EU/OECD report pointing to how inconsistent rule of law is detrimental for polish 
public administration (EU/OECD 2002), some of my environmental interviewees feel 
that too much leeway is given to rule of law with regard to the partnership principle 
and other aspects of implementing EU Funds. This allows interpretation in any way 
one might see fit, and even if the legislation exists and is clear enough, it is not 
always taken into account by the authorities and beneficiaries. The NDP Act states 
that steering and monitoring committees for EU Funds should have one third social 
and economic partners, but it gives no legal grounds for how these partners should be 
selected, and in most cases they are therefore handpicked by a Minister or a 
Voivodship Marshal. Environmentalists claim that this causes dubious nominations 
of social partners for steering and monitoring committees that might not have the best 
competence to take part in the committee work, but whose interests are aligned with 
those of the governing authorities or the project beneficiaries (Guła and Cyglicki 
interview).  
Polish environmentalists see the vague legislation on social and economic partnership 
as a problem that could partly be solved in Brussels with stricter guidelines in the 
programming documents from the EU. National governments would then be 
pressured to implement their own clear legislation, and the social and economic 
partners would easily be able to make a case if they felt mistreated (Śmigrowska 
interview).  
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6.2.2 A pragmatic approach to partnership 
The vagueness in today’s programming documents can be perceived as deliberately 
and pragmatically sustained by the Polish government and the EU as it suits their 
hierarchical systems of power well. At the end of the day the main objection of most 
EU funding is social and economic cohesion, e.g. increasing GDP and building roads 
and water treatment plants. The partnership principle and elements concerning 
democratic consolidation are important, but not the main priority (Malarz and 
Czeczko interview). The Council of the EU’s narrowing down of article 10 
concerning the partnership principle in a proposed regulation from the European 
Commission is an example of such pragmatism, mentioned above in chapter 5.2.1 
(European Commission 2004c).  
It can also be argued that the lack of very specific legislation on partnership means 
that this is confronted and debated between the Polish partners, in itself important for 
the consolidation of democracy, instead of a competed recipe for dialogue being 
delivered on a silver platter from Brussels. If all else fails and the government rushes 
on in an oblivious and environmentally unfriendly but effective fashion, the ENGOs 
have already shown that they are able to approach the Commission directly and stop 
financing from being passed for Cohesion Fund projects, on the grounds of the 
preparations and EIA not being satisfactory (Guła and Cyglicki interview).  This 
might be more difficult in the 2007–2013 period as less of the decision making 
requires European Commission consent, unlike all Cohesion Fund projects today.  
6.3 State apparatus 
The role of the democratically consolidated state apparatus is to enforce the laws and 
procedures established by the political society on the grounds of support from the 
civil, political and economic societies, and to structure many of the relationships 
between these societies (Linz & Stepan 1996:14). One of these structuring tasks is the 
programming of EU Funds. In order to keep the H0 hypothesis of my study, the 
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democratically consolidated state apparatus must make sure that the funds are 
implemented in accordance with the rules and procedures decided by the political 
society, e.g. the legislation on partnership discussed above, involving dialogue and 
cooperation with the civil society. Public participation in the state domain can be 
harder in practice than in theory since the bureaucratic nature of this domain with its 
sometimes chaotic division of power between the state’s many hierarchies can 
expand but also easily reduce the number of “access points” for actors from outside 
the state. In addition, the form that public participation in this domain eventually 
takes is dependent on the previous history of the state apparatus and the individual 
civil servants who work in it and their political flavouring and common “esprit de 
corps” (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:81).  
6.3.1 Dialogue and cooperation in practice 
My interviewees from civil society express mixed feelings when discussing dialogue 
and cooperation with the state apparatus, and the general feeling I get is that ENGO 
representatives have many positive experiences from taking part in the programming 
of EU funds, but also negative ones. The dialogue is regarded as more transparent 
and professional at a national level than regionally, and many environmentalists seem 
to feel that the ministries are generally interested in their competence and somewhat 
alternative perceptions on EU funding. The MoE is better evaluated that the other 
ministries and the closest contact has developed with this ministry, as they have the 
same field of interests and it is felt that they are willing to listen to the ENGOs, e.g. 
let them nominate their own representatives for steering committees. ENGOs are 
therefore sad to see the MoE playing a smaller role in the 2007–2013 funding, and 
retrospectively realise that the dialogue they have had with this ministry was really 
quite constructive and that influencing EU Funds might be harder in the future, with 
the Ministry of Regional Development taking over much of the control over the funds 
(Śmigrowska interview).   
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6.3.2 Communist concrete 
While it might be natural for the MoE to cooperate relatively well with ENGOs 
because of their common interest in the environment, the functioning of the state 
apparatus must also be perceived as historically path dependent of authoritarian 
times, when the state enjoyed a monopolistic role, deciding all political outcomes. 
Change takes time and the heritage from the days of communism in Poland can be 
perceived as having affected the institutional design of the whole state apparatus, the 
minds of those working within it and the relationships to the other societal arenas of 
democratic consolidation (Ekiert & Kubik 1999:86–94). 
In a practical sense when discussing the inclusion of social partners in the 
programming of EU Funds with my interviewees, the communist heritage is seen as 
detrimental to this inclusion in several ways. “Communist concrete” is a slang 
expression used when describing the old-fashioned, resistant and uncooperative ex-
communist culture within the state, perceived as common further down in the 
unreformed parts of the state apparatus, directorates and in the regional government. 
This is typically the level of administration that the EU/OECD report criticised for 
not fully implementing the new Civil Service Act, as was mentioned in chapter 2.2.3 
(EU/OECD 2002). Professionalism is too weak while politicisation is too strong in 
some areas, and one of the main ENGO criticisms of the state apparatus at this level 
is that it is often not capable of implementing EU Funds properly as a result of this.  
The implementing bodies for transport projects within the CF are portrayed by the 
environmental interviewees as institutions full of communist concrete — inefficient 
and out of touch with the new EU reality. The ENGOs are irritated with PKP for not 
creating more rail projects and spending their share of the transport budget in the 
2004–2006 funding, and they are thus partly blamed for the reduction in the amount 
of EU Funds for rail projects in 2007–2013 (Śmigrowska interview).  
The GDDKiA is criticised for not taking proper consideration of environmental 
legislation from Brussels, e.g. the Natura 2000 directive, establishing special 
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protection areas for threatened habitats and species. Via Baltica, a road project from 
Helsinki to Warsaw that is part of the Trans-European Transport Networks is such an 
example. The road project has been stopped by the Bern Convention38 and is now 
awaiting new environmental assessments, after much criticism of its controversial 
route through forests and wetlands in North Eastern Poland (Reinvang 2005). The 
ENGOs argue that had the road planners cooperated with them all along, they could 
have foreseen the environmental concerns that were bound to arise with such 
controversial routes, and with the help of ENGO expertise develop alternative 
schemes earlier (Rytel interview). 
6.3.3 Transparency 
Transparency in the programming of EU Funds is another important factor to judge 
the state apparatus by regarding democratic consolidation, as it reduces the possibility 
of corruption and eases the participation of other societal arenas. The environmental 
interviewees feel that transparency is readily achieved regarding practical information 
and technical data about the projects voted upon in the steering committees for the 
CF. The information is usually sent a week in advance, and if not thorough enough 
the committee members can always contact the ministry for more information. 
However, the exact criteria for selecting the projects that have ended on the lists 
presented to the committees, and the exact roles of politicians and the intermediate 
bodies regarding this selection process, is less clear and seen as a problem by 
environmentalists. A common ENGO opinion is that the table is already set when 
they take part in steering committee meetings and that they are primarily “voting 
machines” used to give legitimacy to the (possibly corrupt) positions that have 
already been taken by civil servants, politicians, consultants and beneficiaries (Guła 
and Cyglicki interview; Metera interview).  
 
38 The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats known as the Bern Convention is a 
binding international legal instrument created by the Council of Europe that aims to conserve wild flora and fauna and their 
natural habitats throughout the European continent.   
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This brings us back to the question of pragmatism regarding EU Fund 
implementation discussed in chapter 6.2.2. Since steering committees are strictly not 
required by the EU, and most other EU members use only monitoring committees for 
the required assessment of EU funding it is hard to argue that democratic 
consolidation requires completely horizontal implementation at all levels. A 
government position is that it is inefficient to discuss the implementation of every 
single Euro at the project preparation stage, and that expanding the role of steering 
committees is unrealistic when the alternative is not having such committees at all 
(Gliniecka interview; Malarz and Czeczko interview). Without steering committees 
from 2007 it will be even more important to ensure that the beneficiaries conduct 
proper consultations with social and economic partners when developing projects, an 
exercise that is often weak today. 
6.4 Economic society  
In a liberal western tradition democratic consolidation is perceived as linked not only 
to the state, the political arena or civil society, but also to the market economy, and as 
assumed by Linz and Stepan: 
A nontrivial degree of market autonomy and ownership diversity in the 
economy is necessary to produce the independence and liveliness of 
civil society so that it can make its contribution to a democracy 
(1996:11).  
Alternatively, aspects of such market thinking and ownership diversity can from a 
Marxist or communitarian point of view be perceived as slightly detrimental to civil 
society liveliness, and the green values and the environmental causes that Polish 
ENGOs are fighting for (Fauks 1999:34). This arena has fuelled consumption and 
rapid economic growth in Poland, causing pollution and increased social inequality 
between rich and poor, and must therefore also be seen as forming values, norms and 
actions that finally can affect the quality of ENGO participation in the programming 
of EU Funds. Regarding my hypotheses from chapter 1.7 the H0 hypothesis can be 
rejected if the economic society in post-communist Poland is not sufficiently 
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consolidated, lacking the legal and regulatory framework produced by the political 
society and widely respected by other arenas, giving market mechanisms the 
necessary support but also limiting their influence when harmful for democratic 
consolidation, e.g. isolating civil society. Except for casual talk about bad practices 
and possible corruption regarding the lack of transparency, it seems to be the latter 
rather than the former task of the economic society that needs strengthening. 
6.4.1 Green values 
As was discussed in chapter 3.4, there just does not seem to be much focus on green 
values in Poland at the moment. There are many reasons for this, but one main 
explanation is the process of social and economic cohesion that the Polish society is 
going through in order to modernise, a process fuelled by economic growth and 
market liberalism. With its low wage level, and central geographical position, Poland 
can and should use the common European market for what it is worth in order to 
reduce unemployment and strengthen the Polish economy. This growth argument 
takes all focus away from more post-materialist values, like the sustainability of 
Polish nature. My environmental interviewees are all very explicit about not wanting 
to hinder economic growth in Poland, but believe that the choices made now should 
be well thought through so as not to be regretted in the future. Thanks to uneven 
urbanisation and industrialisation, especially in the east, a unique and large natural 
environment has managed to survive in Poland. 29 % of the country consists of 
woodland and forests, which is one of the highest levels in Europe, and the central 
position on the continent means that major European geological regions overlap here, 
contributing to a high biological and landscape diversity. Poland’s nature is therefore 
perceived as important for European natural heritage (Chief Inspectorate for 
Environmental Protection 2003:177).    
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6.4.2 Economic growth versus environmental sustainability 
Road building is an area which is important for economic growth since it eases the 
transportation of labour and goods within, and out of a country, and financing road 
projects is therefore recognised by the EU as important for social and economic 
cohesion. The Polish road network is generally in a poor state, and rapid economic 
growth has doubled number of passenger cars from 5 to 10 million between 1990–
2001, causing major traffic problems and accidents (ibid.:15, 226).  
As the aforementioned Via Baltica problems showed, there are often conflicting 
interests between a projected road and the natural habitat that lies in its way. Many of 
the road interests are of an economic character, and ENGOs experience that there is 
little will to compromise on possible economic growth and employment that the road 
scheme might create. The environmentally controversial Via Baltica route passes by 
the city of Białystok, and is important for local residents, politicians and the Polish 
government who all expect the road to bring new jobs and trade to this regional 
capital of 300.000 people. The main alternative route passing the town of Łomża 70 
kilometres away will not give the same beneficial effect on the regional economy, but 
is much more environmentally sustainable as it is the route that the existing road 
takes (Reinvang 2005). The will to find compromises seems to be lacking in many of 
these road projects and they lead to frustrating stand offs between the parts of civil 
society promoting environmental sustainability, and the rest of civil society, 
politicians and the business sector, wanting economic growth and the creation of new 
jobs. People get upset and some even receive death threats, as was the case for an 
NGO activist in Białystok (Guła and Cyglicki interview; Rytel interview).  
One of the hot potatoes from the environmental steering committee, a waste 
incinerator planned in Kraków, is another example of where economic growth comes 
up against the environment. The incinerator is supposed to be built in place of an old 
steelworks, on a site that is only regulated for industrial projects. In addition to 
efficiently dealing with the city’s waste problems, the project has been presented as a 
way of generating new jobs in the area. It was therefore perceived as a sensible 
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project by all steering committee members except the two ENGO representatives who 
are afraid that it will reduce the recycling initiatives in the city (Malarz and Czeczko 
interview).  
The ENGO representatives are also upset about how this incinerator project was 
handled in the steering committee, and believe the MoE stepped out of line when the 
project beneficiary from Kraków was invited to present the controversial incinerator 
project at a steering committee meeting. The ENGOs see this as favouritism and an 
undemocratic practice since all beneficiaries did not get similar chances to present 
their projects (Guła and Cyglicki interview; Kassenberg interview). Although a minor 
case, it exemplifies the high expectations of the ENGOs taking part, and the 
importance of economic growth for Poland today.  
6.5 Civil society 
Finally, the democratic arena of civil society must be taken into account when 
discussing the implications that democratic consolidation has for the programming of 
EU Funds. Civil society helps monitor the other democratic arenas and generates 
ideas, interests and values that these arenas feed on. A democratically consolidated 
civil society is lively and strong, and exists with legal guarantees from rule of law, 
enforced by the state apparatus if violated. Economic society is also important for the 
consolidated civil society as it supports this arena financially and helps generate the 
societal pluralism so important for civil society (Linz & Stepan 1996: 14). My H0 
hypothesis can therefore be rejected if weaknesses in civil society or its relationship 
with the other democratic arenas end up being disadvantageous for civil society’s 
own participation in EU Fund programming, in the form of ENGOs. 
6.5.1 Financial sustainability  
All in all the ENGOs taking part in the programming of EU Funds at a national level 
in Poland are perceived as rather resourceful. They have set up the Coalition of Polish 
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Environmental NGOs on EU Funds and thereby created a common bargaining 
position in order to effectively pull together and draw on each others resources when 
taking part in EU funding. They also keep in contact with colleagues around Europe, 
and take part in international networks addressing the matters at hand.  
For the ENGO representatives I met with, environmentalism is a profession, a 
fulltime job with a salary and an office to go to every morning. A general feeling 
among my interviewees is that EU membership has offered many new funding 
possibilities as long as one has good project ideas, and that it is more often a question 
of having too few staff to realise the good ideas, than the funding not being 
attainable. Where there are funding difficulties, creative ways are found to solve 
these, such as Green Mazovia in Warsaw that runs a youth hostel on its premises after 
office hours (Rytel interview; Śmigrowska interview).  
Even if the professional ENGOs taking part in EU funding at a national level are 
relatively financially sustainable, they complain about lacking the means to spend a 
sufficient amount of time assessing the various projects. In addition they feel that the 
government should pay for travel costs of attending steering committee meetings both 
of principle and as this can be quite expensive for small ENGOs. These issues vary in 
practice, and whereas the voluntary steering committees for EU Funds, including the 
two CF committees, generally do not cover the travel expenses of social and 
economic partners, the obligatory monitoring committees generally do pay for this, 
and can even in some cases decide to spend extra money from the technical assistance 
budget to enhance the assessment of a project, e.g. hiring additional consultants (Guła 
and Cyglicki interview; Rytel interview). Although it was never a big issue in my 
interviews, reimbursing travel costs shows that the ENGOs have clear, expectant 
ideas of what their own participation in EU Funds should entail, and are consequently 
easily disappointed with how their participation works out in reality. 
Disappointment can cause CSOs to somewhat lose interest in EU Funds as they 
realise that their own roles in planning and implementing these funding schemes are 
lesser than they were led to believe before joining the EU. This disappointment was 
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also mentioned as a possible reason for why environmentalists did not know more 
about the EEA-grants, or had lost interest in these. They perceive the government as 
wanting to take control of this funding scheme too, marginalising their own 
participation (Guła and Cyglicki interview; Śmigrowska interview). 
6.5.2 ENGO partnership 
As well as financial sustainability, the role of civil society in EU Fund programming 
is inevitably also linked to how well organised this sector is. From a government 
point of view the ENGOs taking part in the programming of Cohesion Funds are 
always well-prepared for steering committee meetings, often more so than many 
other committee members. Their expertise on ecology and EU environmental policy 
is valued and their participation even seen as increasing the legitimacy of the 
decisions made in the committee. Naturally, irritation is also felt with the 
environmentalists, as they are often vociferously complaining, without necessarily 
offering constructive alternatives (Kędzierski interview; Malarz and Czeczko 
interview).  
The Polish ENGOs feel well-organised too, and think of themselves as playing lead 
roles regarding civil society interaction in EU Funds. They have been quick to 
organise and orientate themselves in post-communist Poland, and perceive their own 
environmental struggles as having door opening effects on Polish civil society and 
democratisation as a whole, as exemplified by the fact that the legal act providing 
access to environmental information entered into force in 2001, while the act 
allowing the access to general public information followed suit a year later (Guła and 
Cyglicki interview). 
The Coalition of Polish Environmental NGOs on EU Funds is a strengthening factor 
for the Polish ENGOs taking part in EU funding, since it eases coordination and the 
spread of information on the internet39 and at seminars that are arranged, so that 
 
39 http://www.koalicjafs.org.pl. 
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positive and negative experiences can be shared, strategies laid and programming 
documents consulted. The Coalition feels it has a broad base and people it can contact 
in every corner of Poland for local, expert information about a proposed project 
should this be necessary. The Polish Green Network plays an important role in this 
sense since it consists of 9 different environmental organisations that are more 
grassroots oriented than the scientific think tanks also taking part (ibid.). 
6.5.3 Eco freaks 
Even if the ENGO milieu is well organised and seems to have the financial means to 
take actively part in the programming of EU Funds, there is a great lack of 
environmental awareness in Poland, and the environmentalists feel stereotyped as 
“eco freaks” who can not be taken seriously. This serves as a reminder that 
democratic consolidation is also about values, not only formal structures. The 
experience of my interviewees was that respect was won over time, after the ENGOs 
had accomplished getting the European Commission to put CF projects on hold for 
breaching EIA regulations. Such “victories” show the government and other partners 
involved in EU Funds that the ENGOs know what they are talking about and that one 
should listen more carefully to them in future consultations and steering committee 
meetings, and not only brush them aside or outvote them (ibid.). This conviction 
would possibly be even clearer if the European Commission took a firmer stance 
against projects that breach EU legislation rather than solely placing them on hold as 
is often the case today. This is difficult as many different interests are also found 
within the European Commission. My interviewees from the MoE expect for 
example that the controversial waste incineration project in Kraków will eventually 
be built as the Regional Directorate-General in Brussels is positive, while the 
Environment DG can be pragmatically won over since the incinerator is planned built 
on an existing industrial estate (Malarz and Czeczko interview). 
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6.6 Summing up 
In this chapter the experiences and perceptions of those taking part in steering 
committees for EU Funds have been discussed in the context of Linz & Stepan’s five 
democratic arenas. Just as these arenas interact in the consolidation theory, the 
programming of EU Funds in Poland is taking place in and between these different 
arenas resulting in good and bad practices concerning civil society integration. The 
main interaction is between ENGOs, the state apparatus and the political society in 
steering committees and during consultations of EU funded programmes and projects. 
As the state apparatus is widely responsible for implementing EU funds, this arena 
with its politicised and partly old-fashioned bureaucracy can be criticised for not 
promoting more pluralism and dialogue with ENGOs and other groups in civil 
society when implementing policy. The blame should however be spread much 
broader, including Brussels for not promoting the partnership principle more strongly 
in the Member States, ENGOs for expecting too much of these EU Funds and the 
Polish people and its elected political representatives for not being more 
environmentally conscious. On the basis of the discussion in this chapter I find it 
natural to reject the H0 hypothesis and conclude that the lack of consolidation within 
or between the five arenas of democracy can be regarded as a hindrance for ENGO 
participation in EU Funds.  
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7. Conclusions and Reflections 
7.1 The research question revisited 
The research question posed at the beginning of this thesis was how democratic 
consolidation can effect the participation of ENGOs in EU Funds. My objective has 
been to show that notions of democratic development can help to explain the societal 
power structures and institutional practices that eventually affect policy 
implementation. Democratisation theory and Polish history has thus been used as a 
backdrop for a contemporary discussion on civil society involvement in policy 
implementation, namely EU Funds in Poland. This approach stems from a liberal, 
western governance tradition promoting pluralism and horizontal implementation as a 
good practice that can provide results in touch with what society wants, strengthening 
the dialogue and cooperation within and between the different societal arenas taking 
part.  
7.1.1 Dialogue and cooperation 
The underlying notion of dialogue and cooperation between different actors in 
society as strengthening democracy is the basis for the research question in chapter 
1.3, and this thesis is thus a study of the practical implications of such a notion. Initial 
democratic transition and consolidation allows for the horizontal implementation of 
EU funding, which is enhanced by the higher level of consolidation creating more 
communication within and between Linz and Stepan’s five arenas (1996). Within 
Polish civil society EU Funds have clearly had a strengthening effect on the ENGO 
milieu as they have created incentives for setting up national and international 
coalitions dealing with funding issues. These coalitions have become the platforms 
for dialogue between civil society, political society and state apparatus both at a 
national level and in Brussels. 
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The steering committees set up by the Polish government have been important 
domains for this dialogue between civil society and the government and political 
society, and although it is questionable how much influence an environmentalist 
member has, representing a minority interest in a committee with majority voting, 
participation is itself a bonding contact between the different arenas. The contact 
clearly developed as a result of the steering committee participation, e.g. between the 
ENGO milieu and the MoE that were cooperating on setting up an online process for 
democratically electing ENGO representatives for Structural Funds’ steering and 
monitoring committees after this had been a success for the Cohesion Fund steering 
committee. Developing contact was also the case after ENGOs managed to block 
funding from Brussels on the basis of the projects breaching EU environmental 
legislation, and were as a result consulted more seriously concerning EIA 
assessments (Guła and Cyglicki interview).  
An obvious conclusion must therefore be that the dialogue and cooperation that after 
all exists between all five arenas makes it clear that the concept of these different 
autonomous spheres “talking together” in the programming of EU funds is partly 
implemented, while the observed bad practices and frustrations discussed in the 
chapter above indicates that work still remains improving this dialogue, allowing me 
to reject the H0 hypothesis. Such a conclusion corresponds to the formal democratic 
requirements for EU Member States, in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Acquis. 
Poland has formally democratised and thus earned its EU membership, but there is 
still “fine-tuning” to be done. 
7.1.2 Polish fine-tuning — changing the whole engine? 
Linz and Stepan (1996), Kaldor and Vejvoda (1999) and other supporters of 
democratic consolidation theory perceive democratisation as a fine-tuning process to 
make democracy “the old game in town” and a deeply habitual, even psychological  
part of human life. Poland has been consolidating its democracy for almost two 
decades, but when will this consolidation end? The new right-wing government has 
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portrayed itself as the clean break with the past that Poland needs in order to clean up 
the corruption and communist concrete in the state apparatus. Is this solely cheap 
election rhetoric, unachievable with the authoritarian elements in the new 
government, or is it the chance that Poland needs in order to finally lose its post-
communist identification tag and start looking more optimistically towards the 
future? What is clear is that one can not change the engine and expect everything to 
start functioning smoothly in 2005 as in 1989. The democratic institutions and ideas 
created must be constantly nurtured and developed, in Poland as everywhere else 
(Linz & Stepan 1996:457).   
The engine for implementing EU Funds is also being changed before the new EU 
budget period commences in 2007, with new programming documents, operational 
programmes and the Ministry of Regional Development to administer it all. What the 
exact changes will mean for ENGO participation is hard to say at this point, but the 
partnership principle is still in place, as is Poland’s obligation to follow the Aarhus 
Convention and conduct broad consultations with civil society. However, there is a 
chance that steering committees will disappear from 2007 as this solution is not 
optimal today. ENGOs feel like “voting machines” and would like more influence or 
at least transparency regarding selection of the projects voted on, while the 
government feels that the steering committee is an inefficient and unnecessary 
process as it is strictly not required by the EU (Guła and Cyglicki interview; Malarz 
and Czeczko interview).  
7.2 Methodological reservations and future research 
According to Yin (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2004), using theory together with case 
studies and thus creating “analytical generalisations” can be a constructive way of 
conducting research since it can improve the theory and thus the external validity of 
the case studies. In this study I’ve put the programming of EU Funds in Poland to 
such a test in the form of democratic consolidation theory. Although it is difficult to 
use my findings to generalise about democratic consolidation, the positive and 
 103
negative experiences from EU Fund programming in Poland add to the existing 
literature on democratic consolidation in Poland that is slowly letting a particular 
pattern of Polish democracy emerge. Much more research is nevertheless needed, 
especially concerning the “softer”, social capital related areas of this consolidation, 
important for the inclusion of civil society in the democratic fine-tuning. 
A slight reservation can be made concerning the internal validity of my study by 
asking to what extent democratic consolidation theory is the best way of discussing 
partnership in Polish EU Funds (Ringdal 2001). The fact that many western 
democracies don’t have steering committees while Poland does, suggests that it might 
be time to treat the EU-8 countries as fully-consolidated “post-postcommunist” 
Member States and analyse policy implementation there as one would in Western 
Europe, e.g. an institutional governance perspective. Focusing less on democratic 
consolidation and more on the general problems of governance would also make it 
easier to conduct comparative studies of how EU policy is affected and affects 
society differently in Member States in different parts of Europe. As a master thesis 
has its obvious limitations regarding time and resources I chose to leave all other 
doors shut and concentrate on democratic consolidation in Poland, the largest new 
EU Member State. 
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Appendix  
List of interviewees 
All the interviewees listed below were interviewed in Warsaw during the beginning 
of 2006, except where stated that that the interviews were conducted by email. In 
addition to these, conversations were had with other actors in Norway and Poland on 
an informal basis. 
Name Position Date 
Anna Kozieł Warsaw Liaison Officer, 
Polish NGO Office in 
Brussels  
17 Jan 
Andrzej Kassenberg President of Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 
ENGO representative in 
Environmental Steering 
Committee for Cohesion 
Fund 2004–2006 
18 Jan. 
Artur Bartoszewicz EU Funds Expert , Polish 
Confederation of Private 
Employers Lewiatan  
26 Jan 
Andrzej Guła  
 
 
ENGO representative in 
Environmental Steering 
Committee for Cohesion 
Fund 2004–2006, Polish 
Institute of Environmental 
30 Jan 
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and Robert Cyglicki 
Economics  
ENGO representative in 
two Transport Steering 
Committees, for Cohesion 
Fund 2004–2006 and 
Structural Funds (SOPT), 
Polish Green Network 
Jakub Majewski “ENGO” representative in 
Structural Funds’ Steering 
Committee for Transport, 
Institute for Railway 
Development and 
Promotion 
1 Feb 
Jerzy Kędzierski Ex vice-president of the 
National Fund for 
Environmental Protection 
and Water Management, 
and Member of 
Environmental Steering 
Committee for Cohesion 
Fund 2004–2006   
7 Feb 
Marta Śmigrowska Coordinator of the 
Coalition of Polish 
Environmental NGOs on 
EU Funds  
8 Feb 
Dorota Metera Board Member of the 
World Conservation 
13 Feb 
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Union (IUCN Poland), 
Member of Steering 
Committee of Rural 
Development Programme 
(Technical Assistance) 
Justyna Andrzejewicz EU Funds Expert, Bank 
Millennium, Warsaw 
Research Student, London 
School of Economics 
14 Feb 
Krzysztof Rytel ENGO representative in 
Structural Funds’ 
Monitoring Committee for 
Transport, Green Mazovia 
15 Feb 
Aleksandra Malarz  
 
 
 
 
and Malgorzata Czeczko 
Deputy Director, Dept. of 
European Integration, 
Ministry of Environment 
(MoE) and Secretary of 
Cohesion Fund Steering 
Committee for 
Environment  
Cohesion Fund specialist, 
Dept. of European 
Integration, Ministry of 
Environment (MoE) 
20 Feb 
Agnieszka Gliniecka In charge of logistics for 
Structural Funds’ Steering 
Committee for Transport, 
23 Feb 
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Dept. of Investment and 
Economic Analysis, 
Ministry of Transport and 
Construction (MoTC) 
Mariusz Pulikowski 
 
Cohesion Fund specialist. 
Dept. of Investment and 
Economic Analysis, 
Ministry of Transport and 
Construction (MoTC) 
23, 28 March, Email 
Joanna Książek Cohesion Fund specialist, 
Dept. of European 
Integration, Ministry of 
Environment (MoE)  
7 April, Email 
Interview guide 
This conversation is conducted as a part of my master thesis in political science at the 
University of Oslo. I am interested in the role that civil society may play in times of 
rapid economic growth and democratic development, such as now in post-accession 
Poland. The environmental sector is an important part of Polish civil society, 
especially important in times of modernisation, and I am therefore focusing on the 
roles that ENGOs play for the planning and implementation of EU Funds (namely 
Cohesion and Structural Funds). I’ve understood that there are both positive and 
negative experiences with EU funds since accession in 2004, and I would like to 
discuss some of these with you, and more specifically how civil society fits into it all. 
I wish to record this interview since it will ease my later work and hinder 
misunderstandings in this complex field of EU funding. I hope this is fine by you, but 
please tell me if you feel uncomfortable with being recorded as we go along, and I 
will stop the tape. On another note It not a problem for me to make you anonymous 
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when I later refer to this interview in my thesis, so let me know if there is anything 
that you would like “sensitised”. I wish to discuss the following with you: 
7.2.1 EU Funds 
• Your background and work in general (in the gov. department, NGO). 
• Your general perception on EU funds and Poland’s development (what works, 
what does not? Which funds do you know and what are they for?). 
• Tell me about your experience with EU Funds (+/– experiences, how 
partnership came about, how committees are set up, which lessons were 
learnt?). 
• Cooperation with ENGOs/government/other committee members. Who do you 
communicate with regarding EU funds, how do you communicate? 
Regionally, nationally, internationally? (share some stories if you can?)  
• Time and money pressure? Does this influence participation in EU funding? Is 
there any money to be had? Technical assistance?  
• Complexity of EU funding. What about ”know-how” and information on how 
EU funding works? Is this at an adequate level in your organisation? To what 
extent is this a problem, that you don’t have the knowledge to take part in EU 
funding. How should it be, ideally?   
7.2.2 Environmentalism in Poland 
• General perception of environmental issues in Poland and the 
environmentalists fronting them or how is your ENGO surviving, financial 
sustainable? How do you perceive the current government in relationship to 
environmental issues? 
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7.2.3 Post-communist democracy 
• Polish bureaucrats and politicians? Slow, corrupt and politicised bureaucracy 
or efficient, independent, transparent and professional? How does national 
level vary from regional level?  
• Political culture in steering committees or consultation process. Is Poland 
“post-postcommunist” yet? 
• Brussels as a political entity. Do they care about HOW things are done, or are 
they mostly interested in just getting the money off their hands, without really 
considering how it is spent 
• Do you think there are differences in the way gov. treats different parts of civil 
society? That EU funding is somewhat politicized? Is it easier for some to take 
part? Catholic, conservative NGOs? 
• The future. New budget period from 2007–2013. New Polish gov from 2005. 
They have promised to make changes in how EU Funds are implemented. 
What do you think the future has in store? 
Thank you ever so much for finding the time to meet me. If there are topics you feel 
we’ve not touched upon, please say so now, or contact me later. I hope you don’t 
mind me emailing you if I have any further questions. I would also like to get in 
touch with others, who might have interesting stories etc, so don’t hesitate to let me 
know if there’s anyone you recommend me to talk to.   
 
 
